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INTRODUCTION 
Sooner or later, the federal government will assign a price to carbon dioxide 
emissions via legislation. The contents of that legislation will reflect negotiated 
agreement—built on various political tradeoffs—over a host of policy issues, ranging 
from taxes to energy efficiency standards. These tradeoffs would implicate not only the 
scope and price assigned by the carbon pricing policy, but also the policies with which it 
would interact. This paper anticipates that price will take the form of a carbon tax and 
describes interactions between that tax and various existing and proposed policies 
relating to climate change, energy, and environmental protection. It proceeds in five 
parts: Part 1 highlights three key points of background; Part 2 summarizes the universe 
of policies that can be expected to interact with a carbon tax; Part 3 provides a rough 
typology of interactions among a carbon tax and other policies, labeling them 
Complementary, Concurrent, or Conflicting; Part 4 identifies several important potential 
tradeoffs; and Part 5, which is less descriptive and more prescriptive than the other four, 
highlights the risks of particular tradeoffs to the effectiveness of a climate change 
mitigation policy suite that includes a carbon tax. One thing this paper omits is a 
discussion of the quantities of GHG emissions that would likely be reduced by a carbon 
tax alongside or as a net result of combination with other policies—existing or 
otherwise.1 This would be a useful line of further research but is beyond this paper’s 
scope. 
                                                     
1 Several researchers have estimated the reduction in carbon emissions expected from different 
tax rates. But to the author’s knowledge, no one has examined the more complex question of 
emissions reductions likely to result from tax rates and the policies examined in this paper. See, 
e.g., Carbon Tax Center, Carbon Tax Effectiveness: Estimated CO2 Reductions from a Briskly 
Rising Carbon Tax, (accessed June 25, 2017); Donald Marron et al., Tax Policy Center, Taxing 
Carbon: What, Why, and How 11 (June 2015), 
http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/publications/taxing-carbon-what-why-and-how/full. 
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Why consider all of this now, in a political climate decidedly averse to 
addressing climate change at all?2 This paper takes as its basic premise that several 
circumstances create a real possibility that Congress could adopt a price on carbon, in 
the form of a tax, sometime around (most likely after) the 2020 presidential election: 
 A substantial number of Republican members of Congress and the Senate 
privately acknowledge the reality of anthropogenic climate change, and would 
support effective mitigation policy if doing so became less politically poisonous 
for them; 
 Republicans’ control of Congress and the White House makes the present an 
opportune time to dismantle Obama-era regulatory responses to climate change, 
namely the Clean Power Plan and other regulations based on an interpretation of 
the Clean Air Act as requiring the Environmental Protection Agency to regulate 
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions; 
 Democrats would oppose bitterly any Republican effort to undo all means of 
mitigating climate change by regulating GHG emissions and some Republicans 
would defect to join them; 
 The Trump campaign promised a large program of infrastructure spending and 
also income tax cuts, leaving open the question of how to secure new revenues to 
cover at least some of the promised spending; 
 Republicans’ complete control of Congress and the White House will not persist, 
and most Republican politicians recognize this; 
 Thus, Republicans currently hold the strongest bargaining position they will 
have for the foreseeable future on the subject of federal climate change mitigation 
policy, and at least some of them recognize this to be the case. 
                                                     
2 See Trump not now considering value-added tax or carbon tax: White House, Reuters, Apr. 4, 2017, 
https://perma.cc/QL3M-6MD3; Exec. Order No. 13,783, Promoting Energy Independence and 
Economic Growth, 82 Fed. Reg. 16,093 (Mar. 28, 2017) (revoking various Obama-era actions and 
memoranda aimed at mitigating and adapting to climate change, such as application of the Social 
Cost of Carbon to the benefit-cost analysis required of signficant federal regulatory actions). 
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1. THREE KEY POINTS OF BACKGROUND 
This paper considers numerous possible interactions among complex policies 
and is necessarily rife with unspecified parameters. This section clarifies three 
parameters that are basic to much else in this paper. 
First: the primary purpose of the carbon tax described in this paper is singular 
and Pigouvian, meaning that it is assumed to aim at discouraging activities that generate 
GHG emissions and thereby cause climate change, and that its other effects (e.g., raising 
tax revenue) are incidental. This is especially significant for the categorization of policies 
in Part 3 of this paper as Complementary, Concurrent, or Conflicting because it means 
that assignment of policies to those categories reflects how they relate to the goal of 
climate change mitigation and not to other, incidental effects.  
Second: the term “carbon tax” as it appears in this paper is specific in two 
respects and ambiguous in several others. It is specific in that it refers to a price assigned 
to emissions of carbon dioxide at a rate that would escalate over time without further 
legislation. As for its ambiguities, this paper does not assume that the tax would: 
 also apply—or not apply—to others of the most important GHGs, namely, 
methane (CH4), nitrous oxide (N2O), and fluorinated gases or “F-gases” (HFCs, 
PFCs, NF3, SF6); 
 be imposed “upstream” on hydrocarbon producers and importers, or 
“downstream” at points where consumers purchase emissions-intensive 
products or services; 
 apply uniformly across sectors or be limited by carve-outs for industries 
especially susceptible to competition from foreign firms not subject to the tax; 
 have at the outset a particular rate of dollars per unit of emissions. 
Third: What to make of the statements and decisions of the Trump 
Administration and Congress since President Trump’s inauguration in January 2017? To 
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date, much has been said but less has been done.3 Furthermore, actions that have been 
taken so far in most instances do not include substantial legislative changes or full-scale 
reversals of existing regulations.4 However, two of the most significant deregulatory 
steps taken thus far do not feature among the negotiable items considered below 
because they change the regulatory process rather than the substance of regulations 
affecting the economy. They are: the removal of the Intergovernmental Working Group’s 
Social Cost of Carbon (SC-CO2) from the components of review required of federal 
agencies when issuing regulations; 5  and the withdrawal of the Council on 
Environmental Quality’s guidance regarding consideration of climate change and GHG 
emissions in environmental impact assessments.6 Though this paper recognizes that 
these tools do not feature in the Trump Administration’s regulatory—or deregulatory—
decision-making process, it refers to the SC-CO2 (which continues to be used by several 
                                                     
3 For a running record of efforts by Congress and the Administration to eliminate regulations 
with implications for climate change, see the Sabin Center for Climate Change Law’s Climate 
Deregulation Tracker, accessible at http://columbiaclimatelaw.com/resources/climate-
deregulation-tracker/.  
4
 See, e.g., EPA, Review of the Clean Power Plan, 82 Fed. Reg. 16329 (Apr. 4, 2017) (stating that EPA will 
comply with EO 13,783 by reviewing the Clean Power Plan with an eye to eliminating it); but see also 
NHTSA & EPA, Notice of Intention To Reconsider the Final Determination of the Mid-Term Evaluation of 
Greenhouse Gas Emissions Standards for Model Year 2022–2025 Light Duty Vehicles, 82 Fed. Reg. 14671 
(Mar. 22, 2017). 
5 E.O. 13,783, supra note 3 (rescinding Social Cost of Carbon employed by OMB and federal 
agencies); see also Interagency Working Group on Social Cost of Carbon, United States 
Government, Technical Support Document: Technical Update of the Social Cost of Carbon for 
Regulatory Impact Analysis Under Executive Order 12866, at 2 (May 2013, revised July 2015) 
(“The purpose of the ‘social cost of carbon’ (SCC) estimates presented here is to allow agencies to 
incorporate the social benefits of reducing carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions into cost-benefit 
analyses of regulatory actions that impact cumulative global emissions. The SCC is an estimate of 
the monetized damages associated with an incremental increase in carbon emissions in a given 
year. It is intended to include (but is not limited to) changes in net agricultural productivity, 
human health, property damages from increased flood risk, and the value of ecosystem services 
due to climate change.”). For a description of the process used by several U.S. federal 
government agencies to estimate the Social Cost of Carbon, see GAO, Regulatory Impact 
Analysis: Development of Social Cost of Carbon Estimates, GAO-14-663 (July 2014), 
https://perma.cc/2JM8-9N8M.  
6 See E.O. 13,783, supra note 3. 
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state-level actors7) as shorthand for the present value of the net damage a marginal unit 
of CO2 does to the climate.8 
2. THE POLICY UNIVERSE AT ISSUE 
Though a carbon tax could be said to interact with a broader array of policies,9 
this paper confines its examination to the policies discussed below, all of which address 
GHG emissions directly, indirectly, or incidentally as they address energy production or 
consumption, or land uses with clear GHG emissions implications. 10  This Part 
summarizes those policies’ supporting legal authority and structure. It focuses first and 
primarily on federal policies, but notes several especially relevant state-level policies as 
well. 
2.1 GHG mitigation authorized by the Clean Air Act  
                                                     
7 The New York Public Service Commission derives the value of Zero Emissions Credits for 
nuclear generation from the SC-CO2. Order Adopting a Clean Energy Standard, New York 
Public Service Commission, Case No. 15-E-0302 (Aug. 1, 2016), https://perma.cc/4XSQ-UR63. 
California’s Air Resources Board applies it to climate-related regulations as well, as instructed by 
state law, which does not specifically name the SC-CO2 developed by the federal government. 
California Air Resources Board, The 2017 Climate Change Scoping Plan Update 60 (Jan. 2017), 
https://perma.cc/7DEZ-ESPS (“Consideration of the social costs of carbon is a requirement in AB 
197.”); Assembly Bill 197 § 3 (Sept. 8, 2016), https://perma.cc/439D-82JP (codified at Cal. Health & 
Safety Code § 38506 (2017)).  
8 This paper refers to this heuristic even though the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
has stated that it understates actual climate damage due to the difficulty of accounting for 
scenarios involving greater than average warming of 3dC and to the omission of significant 
impacts that cannot be monetized with precision. IPCC, Climate Change 2014: Synthesis Report; 
Contribution of Working Groups I, II and III to the Fifth Assessment Report of the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 79, Box 3.1 (R.K. Pachauri & L.A. Meyer eds. 2014). 
9 See National Academies of Sciences, Effects of U.S. Tax Policy on Greenhouse Gas Emissions 
113–34 (William W. Nordhaus et al., eds., 2013) (examining emissions impacts of mortgage 
interest tax deduction and tax exemption of employer-sponsored health coverage). 
10 Policies not considered here include the Minerals Leasing Act of 1920, which was recently the 
legal basis for regulatory limits on methane releases from mineral extraction operations. Bureau 
of Land Management, Waste Prevention, Production Subject to Royalties, and Resource 
Conservation, 81 Fed. Reg. 83008 (Jan. 1, 2017). 
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The Clean Air Act of 1963, as amended in 1970, 1977, and 1990,11 regulates air 
pollutants emitted by mobile and stationary sources and is the most substantial source 
of climate change mitigation authority in the United States. Starting in December 2009 
with its finding that GHG emissions cause or contribute to the endangerment of 
Americans’ public health and welfare,12 EPA began issuing what detractors have called a 
“cascade” of regulations that apply components of the Act’s machinery to sources of 
GHG emissions.13 This summary begins with a brief overview of the Act’s relevant 
components. It then describes sectors and types of GHG sources regulated under the 
Act.  
The Clean Air Act instructs EPA to attend to ongoing scientific findings about 
pollutants’ effects on public health and welfare, and to regulate—or update regulations 
of—those pollutants consistent with what good science demands.14 In Massachusetts v. 
EPA, the Supreme Court resolved the question of whether the list of air pollutants 
regulated by the Clean Air Act must include six GHGs. 15  Technically, that case 
addressed only the question of whether the Act covered GHGs emitted by motor 
vehicles, but because the regulation of pollutants from motor vehicle emissions under 
Section 202 of the Act triggers provisions in other Sections, Massachusetts v. EPA 
knocked over the first in a line of regulatory dominoes that have continued to fall since. 
                                                     
11 Clean Air Act of 1963, Pub. L. 88-206, 77 Stat. 392; Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. 
91-604, 84 Stat. 1676; Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-95, 91 Stat. 685; Clean 
Air Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-549, 108 Stat. 2399; all codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-
7626. 
12 Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Findings for Greenhouse Gases Under Section 202(a) 
of the Clean Air Act, 74 Fed. Reg. 66496 (Dec. 9, 2009). 
13 Petition of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, In re Proposed Endangerment and Cause or 
Contribute Findings for Greenhouse Gases Under Section 202(a) of the Clean Air Act; Proposed 
Rule, 74 Fed. Reg. 18,886, at 25 (June 23, 2009), https://perma.cc/4CRM-2MYL. 
14 Clean Air Act §§ 109(d), 202(a)(1), 231(a)(2)(A). 
15 Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007). The GHGs are: carbon dioxide (CO2), methane 
(CH4), nitrous oxide (N2O), hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs), perfluorocarbons (PFCs), and sulfur 
hexafluoride (SF6). 
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First, effective on December 29, 2009, EPA required emitters to report their GHG 
emissions.16 Next, in May 2010, EPA and the National Highway Transportation Safety 
Administration (NHTSA) revised the Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) 
standards by which they regulate emissions from passenger- and light-duty vehicles for 
model years 2012–2016.17 (EPA and NHTSA have since issued similar standards for 
2017–2025 and later model years,18 and for heavy-duty vehicles as well.19 The fate of the 
light-duty vehicle standards for model years 2022–2025 is currently unclear.20) The next 
domino to fall was EPA’s inclusion of GHGs among the pollutants emitted by stationary 
sources regulated under the Prevention of Significant Deterioration (PSD) and Title V 
permitting programs.21 That inclusion means that new or modified major sources in 
                                                     
16 EPA, Mandatory Reporting of Greenhouse Gases, 74 Fed. Reg. 56260 (Oct. 30, 2009) (“The rule 
does not require control of greenhouse gases, rather it requires only that sources above certain 
threshold levels monitor and report emissions”), codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 98 (authorized by Clean 
Air Act Section 114, Recordkeeping, inspections, monitoring, and entry). 
17 EPA & NHTSA, Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emission Standards and Corporate 
Average Fuel Economy Standards; Final Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 25324 (May 7, 2010). These standards 
are set in a joint rulemaking issued by EPA and the National Highway Transportation Safety 
Administration (NHTSA). EPA’s authority for the rulemaking comes from the Clean Air Act; 
NHTSA’s comes from the 1975 Energy Policy and Conservation Act (EPCA), Pub. L. No. 94–163, 
89 Stat. 871 (Dec. 22, 1975). 
18 EPA & NHTSA, 2017 and Later Model Year Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emissions and 
Corporate Average Fuel Economy Standards; Final Rule, 77 Fed. Reg. 62624 (Oct. 15, 2012). 
19 EPA & NHTSA, Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Fuel Efficiency Standards for Medium- and 
Heavy-Duty Engines and Vehicles—Phase 2, 81 Fed. Reg. 73478 (Oct. 25, 2016). 
20 NHTSA & EPA, Notice of Intention To Reconsider the Final Determination of the Mid-Term 
Evaluation of Greenhouse Gas Emissions Standards for Model Year 2022–2025 Light Duty 
Vehicles, 82 Fed. Reg. 14671 (Mar. 22, 2017); Bob Sussman, Can President Trump roll back the Obama 
emissions and fuel efficiency standards for light-duty vehicles?, Brookings (Feb. 3, 2017), 
https://perma.cc/83B9-GYJG (“Whatever President Trump does, California will likely have the 
last word on the MY 2022-2025 emission limits and fuel economy targets.”). 
21 EPA, Action To Ensure Authority To Implement Title V Permitting Programs Under the 
Greenhouse Gas Tailoring Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 82254 (Dec. 30, 2010); EPA, Limitation of Approval 
of Prevention of Significant Deterioration Provisions Concerning Greenhouse Gas Emitting 
Sources in State Implementation Plans; Final Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 82536 (Dec. 30, 2010); EPA, 
Prevention of Significant Deterioration and Title V Greenhouse Gas Tailoring Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 
31514 (June 3, 2010). 
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“attainment areas” (i.e., areas in compliance with National Ambient Air Quality 
Standards for sulfur dioxide, lead, and other “criteria pollutants”) must seek a permit for 
GHG emissions as well as other pollutants, and must adopt the “best available control 
technology” (BACT) to limit their GHG emissions. 22  Subsequent dominoes have 
included performance standards issued pursuant to Section 111 for several types of 
major new and existing sources of GHG emissions.23 The most recent domino to fall is 
another endangerment finding, this one for GHG emissions from aircraft.24 Regulatory 
dominoes that have yet to fall pertain to aircraft and marine ships; wastewater treatment 
plants; and agricultural facilities, including concentrated animal feeding operations. 
EPA’s Clean Air Act-based GHG regulations place limits on emissions from 
fossil fuel-fired electricity generating units (EGUs), cement plants and other 
manufacturing facilities, oil and gas refineries, solid waste landfills, waste incinerators, 
and vehicles. The regulations that address these sources take diverse approaches. No 
                                                     
22 Like all rules issued by EPA in relation to GHG emissions, these rules, termed the “Timing and 
Tailoring Rules,” were challenged in court. In 2014, the Supreme Court instructed EPA to revise 
the scope of the rule’s implementation of the PSD program slightly, Utility Air Regulatory Group 
v. EPA, 134 S. Ct. 2427 (2014), which EPA has since done. See Prevention of Significant 
Deterioration and Title V Permitting for Greenhouse Gases: Removal of Certain Vacated 
Elements, 80 Fed. Reg. 50,199 (Aug. 19, 2015). As currently applied, the PSD program only limits 
GHGs emitted from “anyway” sources that would have been required to conduct New Source 
Review owing to their emission of some other regulated pollutant. Sources not subject to the PSD 
program for emission of a criteria pollutant are not now subject to that program for their 
emission of GHGs, even if those GHGs exceed the thresholds for program participation specified 
by EPA in the Tailoring Rule. 
23 EPA, Standards of Performance for Municipal Solid Waste Landfills, 81 Fed. Reg. 59,331 (Aug. 
29, 2016); EPA. Standards of Performance for New Stationary Sources and Emission Guidelines 
for Existing Sources: Commercial and Industrial Solid Waste Incineration Units, 81 Fed. Reg. 
40,955 (June 23, 2016); EPA, Oil and Natural Gas Sector: Emission Standards for New, 
Reconstructed, and Modified Sources, 81 Fed. Reg. 35,823 (June 3, 2016); EPA, Standards of 
Performance for Greenhouse Gas Emissions From New, Modified, and Reconstructed Stationary 
Sources: Electric Utility Generating Units, 80 Fed. Reg. 64,509 (Oct. 23, 2015); Carbon Pollution 
Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Electric Utility Generating Units, 80 Fed. 
Reg. 205 (Oct. 23, 2015).  
24 EPA, Finding that Greenhouse Gas Emissions from Aircraft Cause or Contribute to Air 
Pollution that May Reasonably Be Anticipated to Endanger Public Health and Welfare, 81 Fed. 
Reg. 18,399 (Aug. 15, 2016). 
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GHG-specific performance standard applies to cement plants; performance standards 
for new coal-fired power plants require the use of carbon capture and sequestration 
technology but those for new natural gas-fired plants do not;25 performance standards 
for new oil and gas facilities specify a host of technological and operational standards to 
control methane emissions; 26  and performance standards for existing fossil-fueled 
EGUs—better known as the Clean Power Plan27—treat EGUs not as solitary facilities but 
as parts of an integrated electric grid,28 and require “owner/operators” of one or more 
EGUs (rather than individual EGUs) to comply.29 As for road-vehicles, CAFE standards 
set mandatory, fleet-wide targets for miles per gallon and GHG emissions per mile; 
these fleet-wide averages take plug-in hybrid electric and other zero-emitting vehicles 
                                                     
25 80 Fed. Reg. 205; see also Victoria R. Clark and Howard J. Herzog, Assessment of the US EPA’s 
Determination of the Role for CO2 Capture and Storage in New Fossil Fuel-Fired Power Plants, 48 
Environmental Science & Technology 7723, 7723–29 (2014) (examining EPA’s reasons for not 
imposing requirement on gas- as well as coal-fired plants). 
26 81 Fed. Reg. 40,955. 
27 The Clean Power Plan is currently stayed pending decision by the U.S. Supreme Court, 
pursuant to an order of the U.S. Supreme Court. Order in Pending Case, West Virginia v. EPA, 
136 S. Ct. 1000 (Feb. 9, 2016).  
28 80 Fed. Reg. at 64,662, 64,677, 64,725. 
The utility power sector is unlike other industrial sectors. In other sectors, sources 
effectively operate independently and on a local-site scale, with control of their physical 
operations resting in the hands of their respective owners and operators. Pollution control 
standards, which focus on each source in a non-utility industrial source category, have 
reflected the standalone character of individual source investment decision-making and 
operations. * * * 
The core function of providing reliable electricity service is carried out not by individual 
electricity generating units but by the complex machine as a whole. Important subsidiary 
functions such as management of costs and management of environmental impacts are 
also carried out to a great extent on a multi-unit basis rather than an individual-unit basis. 
Generation from one generating unit can be and routinely is substituted for generation 
from another generating unit in order to keep the complex machine operating while 
observing the machine’s technical, environmental, and other constraints and managing its 
costs 
29 Id. at 64,762 (“As a practical matter, the ‘source’ includes the ‘owner or operator’ of any 
building, structure, facility, or installation for which a standard of performance is applicable. For 
instance, under CAA section 111(e), it is the ‘owner or operator’ of a source who is prohibited 
from operating in violation of any standard of performance applicable to such source.”). 
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into account. They also allow manufacturers to claim credits toward emissions 
compliance by upgrading air conditioning systems—whether by substituting for 
refrigerants with a high-GWP, or by improving system components in a way 
demonstrated to reduce the leakage of refrigerant gases.30 A last point about CAFE 
standards, which is discussed at greater length in Part 2.9 below: although CAFE 
standards are codified in federal regulations, the Clean Air Act gives California a seat at 
the table where they are drafted. 
Clean Air Act Section 115, which, unlike the Clean Air Act provisions described 
above, has never been implemented,31 is unique for providing EPA with authority to 
address international air pollution. Specifically, it authorizes EPA to instruct a state’s 
governor to revise the state’s plan for complying with the Clean Air Act in a way that 
eliminates pollutants EPA has found endanger public health or welfare in a foreign 
country, so long as that country has also been found to afford the U.S. essentially the 
same rights under its laws.32 Although a regulation based on Section 115 is at this stage 
hypothetical, because such a regulation would be legally defensible and would arguably 
provide for cost-optimizing nationwide GHG emissions reductions, 33  Section 115 
decidedly belongs on the negotiating table along with other regulatory programs built 
upon Clean Air Act provisions. 
Another potential subject of regulation under the Clean Air Act deserves mention 
here: GHG emissions—particularly nitrous oxide (N2O)—from agricultural operations. 
                                                     
30 Notably, EPA’s authority to make this crediting available to manufacturers not in the Clean Air 
Act, but in EPCA. 77 Fed. Reg. at 62,639 (“EPA is finalizing, under its EPCA authority, rules 
allowing the impact of air conditioning system efficiency improvements to be included in the 
calculation of fuel economy for CAFE compliance.”). 
31 Justin Gundlach, Section 115 in Practice, in Section 115: How an Unsung Provision of the Clean 
Air Act Can Help the United States Tackle Climate Change (Michael H. Burger ed., forthcoming) 
(describing EPA’s and federal courts’ engagement with Section 115, which did not include 
implementation). 
32 Clean Air Act § 115(a)-(c). 
33 See generally Michael Burger et al., Legal Pathways to Reducing Greenhouse Gas Emissions Under 
Section 115 of the Clean Air Act, 28 Geo. Envtl. L. Rev. 359 (2016). 
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EPA regulates N2O emissions from motor vehicles,34 but not from other sources even 
though the N2O emitted by the use of synthetic fertilizers, enteric fermentation, and 
manure from livestock accounts for roughly 7.7 percent of total annual U.S. GHG 
emissions.35 Given the scale of these emissions, and given that N2O’s global warming 
potential is estimated to be 298 times that of CO2, 36  potential regulation of these 
emissions under the Clean Air Act should also be on the negotiating table.37 
 
2.2 Incidental mitigation of GHG emissions by non-GHG pollution 
controls authorized by the Clean Air Act 
Although EPA has not issued National Ambient Air Quality Standards 
(NAAQSs) for GHGs, nor treated any GHG as a Hazardous Air Pollutant (HAP), EPA 
regulations addressing criteria pollutants and HAPs deserve brief consideration here 
because they incidentally reduce GHG emissions, and because EPA has counted those 
incidental reductions among the co-benefits that weigh in favor of imposing such rules. 
Two key examples are the Cross-State Air Pollution Rule (CSAPR),38 which addresses 
                                                     
34 Even that rule allows car manufacturers to treat CO2 emissions as a proxy for N2O rather than 
addressing N2O emissions directly. 40 CFR § 86.1818-12 (2016). 
35 EPA, Inventory of U.S. Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Sinks: 1990–2013, at 2-23, tbl.2-10 (Apr. 15, 
2015), http://bit.ly/1ZMQIod.  
36 Id. at ES-3. 
37 Several petitions for rulemakings to regulate N2O emissions from agricultural sources have 
been filed. See, e.g., Institute for Policy Integrity (IPI), Petition for Rulemakings and Call for 
Information under Section 115, Title VI, Section 111, and Title II of the Clean Air Act to Regulate 
Greenhouse Gases (Feb. 19, 2013), http://bit.ly/2aApctz (seeking regulation of agricultural N2O 
emissions under Clean Air Act Title VI and/or Section 111), Humane Society of the United States 
et al., Petition to List Concentrated Animal Feeding Operations Under Clean Air Act Section 
111(b)(1)(A), and to Promulgate Standards of Performance Under Clean Air Act Sections 111(b)(1)(B) 
and 111(d) (Sept. 21, 2009), http://bit.ly/2aU6UEI.  
38 EPA issued CSAPR in 2011. EPA, Federal Implementation Plans: Interstate Transport of Fine 
Particulate Matter and Ozone and Correction of SIP Approvals, 76 Fed. Reg. 48,208 (Aug. 8, 
2011). The D.C. Circuit rejected the rule. EME Homer City Generation, L.P. v. EPA, 696 F.3d 7 
(D.C. Cir. 2012), but was reversed by the Supreme Court. EPA v. EME Homer City Generation, 
L.P., 134 S. Ct. 1584 (2014). The D.C. Circuit’s subsequent review of EPA’s initial implementation 
of the rule upheld its key elements. EME Homer City Generation, L.P. v. E.P.A., 795 F.3d 118 
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criteria pollutants emitted in one state but that impair NAAQS compliance in another, 
and the Mercury Air Toxics Standard (MATS),39 which tightens restrictions on emissions 
of mercury and other HAPs from coal- and oil-fired EGUs. Both of these, by ensuring 
that new or modified coal-fired power plants cannot operate without incurring 
substantial pollution-control costs, have indelibly altered those plants’ financial profiles 
in a period of historically low natural gas prices. 40  This combination of market 
circumstances and regulatory requirements have helped to spur substantial GHG 
emissions reductions by accelerating closure of existing plants and making investments 
in new or modified plants unappealing. 41  EPA’s cost-benefit justification for both 
                                                                                                                                                              
(D.C. Cir. 2015). EPA has yet to finalize its proposed update of the rule with respect to ozone. 
EPA, Cross-State Air Pollution Rule Update for the 2008 Ozone NAAQS; proposed rule, 80 Fed. 
Reg. 75,706 (Dec. 3, 2015). 
39 EPA issued the MATS rule in December 2011; it was published in the Federal Register in 
February of 2012. National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants From Coal- and 
Oil–Fired Electric Utility Steam Generating Units and Standards of Performance for Fossil–Fuel–
Fired Electric Utility, Industrial–Commercial–Institutional, and Small Industrial–Commercial–
Institutional Steam Generating Units, Final Rule, 77 Fed.Reg. 9304 (Feb. 16, 2012). The D.C. 
Circuit upheld the rule, White Stallion Energy Center, LLC v. E.P.A., 748 F.3d 1222 (D.C. Cir. 
2014), but that decision was overturned by the U.S. Supreme Court, which ordered the D.C. 
Circuit to decide whether to vacate or merely remand it to EPA. Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699 
(2015). The D.C. Circuit did not vacate the rule but instead ordered EPA to make a supplemental 
finding, which EPA did. EPA, Final Supplemental Finding That It Is Appropriate and Necessary 
To Regulate Hazardous Air Pollutants From Coal- and Oil-Fired Electric Utility Steam 
Generating Units, 81 Fed. Reg. 24,420 (Apr. 25, 2016), The D.C. Circuit rejected challenges to the 
EPA’s planned response to its order. White Stallion Energy Center, LLC v. EPA, Case No. 12-1101 
et al., 2015 WL 11051103 (D.C. Circ. Dec. 15, 2015) (remanding rule to EPA without vacatur and 
noting that “EPA has represented that it is on track to issue a final finding”). The Supreme Court 
then denied certiorari from that decision shortly after EPA had issued its Final Supplemental 
Finding. 136 S.Ct. 2463 (Jun 13, 2016). Industry has filed challenges to EPA’s Final Supplemental 
Finding with the D.C. Circuit. Petition for Review, Murray Energy Corp. v. EPA, Case No. 16-
1127 (D.C. Cir. Apr. 25, 2016).  
40 See Rafay Ishfaq et al., Fuel-switch decisions in the electric power industry under environmental 
regulations, 48 IIE Transactions 205, 206–07 (2016) (modeling effect of regulations on fuel-
switching and plant closure decisions in a time of low natural gas prices). 
41 Benjamin Hulac, Analysts blame natural gas, not 'war on coal,' for Peabody's demise, Energy & 
Environment News, Apr. 14, 2016, http://bit.ly/1SO3j5L; Rich Heidorn Jr., MATS Challenge Too 
Late for Targeted Coal Plants, RTO Insider, Mar. 30, 2015, http://bit.ly/2aPStO4 (reporting plans for 
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applied the SC-CO2 to estimate their climate change-related co-benefits.42 For CSAPR, 
climate co-benefits accounted for $23 million or 1.9 to 3.4 percent of the rule $1.2 billion 
total monetized benefits;43 for MATS, it was $360 million or 0.4 to 0.97 percent of the $37-
90 billion total.44 While the direct benefits from cleaner air dwarfed the climate-related 
benefits for both rules, the values added to reflect climate benefits were non-negligible.  
2.3 Energy subsidies 
The federal government subsidizes the production of several sources of energy, 
including non-hydro renewables, nuclear fission, and fossil fuels. Estimates of these 
subsidies vary in what they count as a subsidy and consequently in their tally of 
subsidies’ amounts.45 The Energy Information Administration estimated that the federal 
government provided $11.9 billion in energy subsidies in 2013, including direct 
subsidies, loan guarantees, and tax preferences, and that about 55 percent of those went 
to renewables, 21 percent to nuclear, 10 percent to coal, and 5.5 percent to natural gas.46 
By contrast, one independent estimate concluded that annual federal subsidies for fossil 
                                                                                                                                                              
9,200MW of coal plant closures and that, even before the Supreme Court heard the case, “about 
90% of the capital expenditures needed to meet MATS compliance have already been spent.”). 
42 80 Fed. Reg. at 75,757 (reporting "Estimate Global Climate Co-Benefits of CO2 Reductions for 
the Proposal") 
43 EPA, Regulatory Impact Analysis for the Proposed Cross-State Air Pollution Rule (CSAPR) 
Update for the 2008 Ozone National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS), EPA-452/R-15-
009, at 6-27 to 6-35 (Nov. 2015). This calculation did not estimate benefits from the reduction of 
non-CO2 GHG emissions. Id. at 6-34. 
44 77 Fed. Reg. at 9306, 9431. 
45 Compare D. Coady et al., International Monetary Fund, How Large Are Global Energy 
Subsidies? (2015), https://perma.cc/32LC-QS7S (treating untaxed externalities as subsidies), with 
ELI, Estimating U.S. Government Subsidies to Energy Sources: 2002-2008 (Sept. 2009), 
https://perma.cc/LTR9-264Q (not treating externalities as subsidies), and EIA, Direct Federal 
Financial Interventions and Subsidies in Energy in Fiscal Year 2013 (Apr. 2015), 
https://perma.cc/8XD3-LZPZ (excluding various measures included by ELI).  
46 EIA, supra note 44; but see also Doug Koplow, EIA Energy Subsidy Estimates: A Review of 
Assumptions and Omissions (Mar. 2010), https://perma.cc/CD6C-5DG7 (criticizing EIA’s 
approach to estimating subsidies and arguing that it understates subsidies provided to fossil 
fuels). 
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fuels alone amounted to $17.2 billion in 2013–14.47 Whatever their size, energy subsidies 
would clearly interact with a carbon tax in foreseeable ways.   
Renewable electricity generating facilities benefit from the federal Production 
Tax Credit (PTC for wind, geothermal, closed-loop biomass, and other technologies) and 
Investment Tax Credit (ITC for solar, fuel cells, small-scale wind, and other 
technologies).48 The PTC, which provides facility owners with a rebate based on the 
electricity they produce in their first 10 years of operation, will phase out by 2020.49 The 
ITC, which provides a rebate based on the amount invested in renewable facilities, will 
phase out in 2022.50 Importantly, the renewables sector, like the oil and gas sector, 
benefits from the domestic manufacturing deduction, a tax preference available not only 
to other energy producers, but to an array of U.S. industries.51  
New and existing nuclear reactors receive at least two forms of indirect subsidy: 
a liability insurance backstop, based on the Price-Anderson Act of 1957, as amended in 
1975,52 and support for waste disposal pursuant to the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982, 
as amended in 1988 and 1992 (NWPA).53 New reactors built since 2005 receive additional 
                                                     
47 Alex Doukas, OilChange International, G20 subsidies to oil, gas and coal production: United 
States 2–4 (Nov. 2015), https://perma.cc/69HF-EKPK. 
48 These shorthand titles actually refer to the Renewable Electricity Production Tax Credit, the 
Business Energy Investment Tax Credit, and the Residential Renewable Energy Tax Credit.  
49 Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-113, Div. Q, 129 Stat. 2242 (Dec. 18, 
2015). 
50 Id. 
51 See Doug Koplow, The Domestic Manufacturing Tax Credit and the Oil and Gas Industry, 
EarthTrack Blog (Apr. 1, 2011), https://perma.cc/RH8R-VPSW. 
52 Price-Anderson Nuclear Industries Indemnity Act, Pub. L. No. 85-256, § 4, 71 Stat. 576 (1957), as 
amended by Pub. L. No. 100-408, 102 Stat. 1066 (Aug. 20, 1988), codified at 42 U.S.C. 2212i. 
53 NWPA of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-425, 96 Stat. 2201 (Jan. 7, 1983), as amended by P.L. 100-203, Title 
V, Subtitle A (Dec. 22, 1987), Pub. L. No. 100-507 (Oct. 18, 1988), and Pub. L. No. 102-486 (Oct. 24,  
1992), codified at 42 U.S.C. 10101–10270. 
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subsidies in the form of loan guarantees. 54  Some estimate that the value of Price-
Anderson’s indemnification of nuclear generators for accident-related damages above a 
statutory threshold (currently $500 million per reactor55) is zero, others that it is billions 
of dollars annually.56 Estimates of the subsidy conferred by the NWPA are also diverse, 
and reach as high as five to 18 percent of the market value of nuclear-generated 
electricity sold annually in the U.S. 57  As for the loan guarantees provided for the 
construction of new reactors and reprocessing facilities, they are more easily calculated: 
$ 6.184 billion has been obligated to specific recipients as of 2015 from an authorized 
total of $18.5 billion.58 
Federal laws make several tax preferences available for activities related to the 
production, refining, and sale of coal, oil, and natural gas.59 Unlike the PTC and ITC, the 
provisions of the tax code relevant here are generally permanent. The largest of them 
are: expensing intangible drilling costs, the domestic manufacturing tax deduction for 
                                                     
54 Energy Policy Act of 2005 tit. XVII; see also Mark Holt, Congressional Research Service, Nuclear 
Energy Policy 23–25 (Oct. 2014), https://perma.cc/53SD-GZVR.  
55 42 U.S.C. § 2210(c). 
56
 Compare Michael G. Faure & Tom Van den Borre, Compensating Nuclear Damage: A Comparative 
Economic Analysis of the US and International Liability Schemes, 33 Wm. & Mary Envtl. L. & Pol’y Rev. 
219 (2008) (concluding that Price-Anderson conferred no subsidy after 1975 amendments introduced 
retrospective premium payments), with Doug Koplow, Nuclear Power: Still Not Viable without Subsidies 
84 (Union of Concerned Scientists, Feb. 2011) (adopting estimated value of 0.1 and 2.5 ¢/kWh or $800 
million to several billion dollars per year). 
57 Id. at 104 tbl.27. 
58 Energy Policy Act of 2005, tit. XVII; see also Government Accountability Office, GAO-15-438, 
DOE Loan Programs: Current Estimated Net Costs Include $2.2 Billion in Credit Subsidy, Plus 
Administrative Expenses 19 tbl.3 (Apr. 2015). 
59 Staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation, Description of Present Law and Select Proposals 
Relating to the Oil and Gas Industry, JCX-27-11, May 11, 2011, https://perma.cc/6SRU-BVBH; 
Alan Kovski, Special Report: Tax Provisions Helping Oil and Gas Firms Take Much Criticism but 
Keep Paying Off, BNA Daily Environment Report No. 136, July 15, 2016) (listing the percentage 
depletion deduction and the domestic manufacturing deduction for coal and other hard mineral 
fossil fuels among those tax provisions that the Obama Administration has grouped with tax 
preferences for oil and gas production). See also United States, Fossil Fuels Subsidy Reform: 
Progress Report on Fossil Fuel Subsidies (Nov. 2014) (identifying 11 U.S. fossil fuel tax 
preferences and subsidies for consideration by G20). 
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oil and gas, and percentage depletion for oil and gas wells.60 One commentator has 
observed that what sets tax preferences for U.S. fossil fuel production apart is their 
“sheer variety.”61  
2.4 The “gas tax” and other federal excise taxes on transportation fuels 
The federal motor fuel excise tax or “gas tax,” currently set at $0.184 per gallon, is 
imposed on producers, refiners, and importers of gasoline with an octane rating of at 
least 75 (the diesel tax, set at $0.244 per gallon, is applied similarly).62 Since its initial 
passage in 1932,63 the gas tax has flipped several times (in 1956, 1990, and 1996) from 
being, formally, a general-purpose source of federal revenue to being chiefly a user fee 
that finances federal highways and their ancillary costs.64 For all of that time it has 
persisted and grown without interruption or reduction. Recently, however, it has not 
gathered enough revenue to cover the costs of maintaining highway and mass transit 
systems,65 and the short-term extensions passed by Congress since 2011 have not made 
up the gap.66 
                                                     
60 Gilbert E. Metcalf, Council on Foreign Relations Discussion Paper: The Impact of Removing 
Tax Preferences for U.S. Oil and Gas Production 2–3 (August 2016). 
61 Doukas, supra note 47, at 3. 
62 IRS, Publication 510: Excise Taxes (Including Fuel Tax Credits and Refunds) 5 (Feb. 19, 2016) 
http://bit.ly/2avg38i. States also charge taxes (excise and others) on gasoline and diesel. The 
average rates are $0.25 for gasoline and $0.27 for diesel; the range for gasoline varies from $0.0895 
in Alaska to $0.514 in Pennsylvania. U.S. EIA, Frequently Asked Questions: How much tax do we 
pay on a gallon of gasoline and diesel fuel?, https://perma.cc/T9LR-3PU7 (updated Nov. 25, 2015). 
63 Revenue Act of 1932, ch. 209, Pub .L. No. 154, 47 Stat. 169 (June 6, 1932). 
64 James M. Bickley, The Federal Excise Tax on Gasoline and the Highway Trust Fund: A Short 
History (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, Sept. 7, 2012). Ancillary costs include 
the cleanup of underground gasoline and oil storage tanks, paid for from the Leaking 
Underground Storage Tank Trust Fund. 
65 Joseph Kile, Assistant Director for Microeconomic Studies, CBO, Before the Committee on 
Finance United States Senate, “The Status of the Highway Trust Fund and Options for Paying for 
Highway Spending,” June 18, 2015, https://perma.cc/FTU2-3FVP.  
66 Id. at 4 tbl.1 (showing revenues credited to Highway Trust Fund), fig.2 (showing growing 
shortfall out to 2025). 
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Comparable federal excise taxes are also assessed on other fuels, including those 
used in aircraft and watercraft: aviation gasoline, for instance, is taxed at a $0.194, 
kerosene at $0.244.67 Some of these taxes, like the gas tax, flow to trust funds, such as the 
Sport Fish and Boating Restoration Trust Fund and the Airport and Airway Trust 
Fund.68 No federal tax is assessed on fuels used in international marine shipping, or, 
since 2007, by railroads.69 
2.5 The federal Renewable Fuel Standard 
The production and sale of biofuels, which 
derive from corn starch, corn stover (i.e., husks and 
cobs), sugar cane, or cellulose, have the following 
potential effects on GHG emissions: they can displace 
energy-equivalent but higher-emitting fossil fuels, they 
can cause fuel prices to rise or fall, and they can prompt 
land use changes that release GHGs from fertilizers or 
that would have otherwise remained stored in unused 
soil. An important limitation on these effects is the “E10 
blend wall,” a chemically based 10 percent limit on the ethanol that can be substituted 
for gasoline without damaging conventional engines. 70  “Flex fuel” engines that can 
                                                     
67 IRS, Pub. 150, supra note 60, at 4, 5, 8 (the list of fuel taxes includes aviation gasoline, gasoline 
blendstocks, diesel-water fuel emulsion, kerosene (including kerosene used for aviation), dyed 
diesel and kerosene, compressed natural gas, alternative fuels, fuels used in commercial 
transportation on inland waterways, and any liquid used in a fractional ownership program 
aircraft as fuel). 
68 Federal Aviation Administration, Fact Sheet: Airport and Airway Administration Trust Fund 4 
(2016), https://perma.cc/3F3R-J3NM. 
69 GAO-11-134, at 8. 
70 Kelsi Bracmort, Congressional Research Service, The Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS): In Brief 7–8 
(Jan. 16, 2015) https://perma.cc/GAQ9-V5Q7. Specially designed “flex fuel” engines can handle 
blends of up to 85 percent ethanol. 
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handle higher percentages of ethanol (ranging from 51 to 83 percent but generally 
termed “E85”) remain uncommon.71 
The federal Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS) requires transportation fuel 
distribution companies to purchase specified volumes of plant-based ethanols and to 
blend them with the conventional fuels sold to end-users. Parameters for ethanol 
composition, production volume, and lifecycle GHG emissions estimates were first 
established by the Energy Policy Act of 2005,72 and were then revised by the Energy 
Independence and Security Act (EISA) of 2007.73 EISA’s parameters sort renewable fuels 
into four categories (see Figure 1 at right). All of them exclude fuels whose lifecycle 
GHG emissions are not at least 20 percent lower than those of conventional gasoline.74 
“Advanced biofuels” include those whose GHG lifecycle emissions are at least 50 
                                                     
71 U.S. EIA, Annual Energy Outlook 2016, Table 46. Transportation Fleet Car and Truck Stock by 
Type and Technology (Aug. 2016) https://perma.cc/9BLL-ZCYD (estimating that as of August 
2016 flex-fuel vehicles comprise about 1.36 percent of the total U.S. passenger- and light duty-
vehicle fleet). 
72 Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-58 (2005). As California’s Air Resources Board has 
explained, the difference between ethanols for the purpose of a lifecycle emissions analysis is in 
how they came to be ethanol. CAL. AIR RESOURCES BD., STAFF REPORT: INITIAL STATEMENT OF 
REASONS FOR PROPOSED RULEMAKING--PROPOSED RE-ADOPTION OF THE LOW CARBON FUEL 
STANDARD, at III-62 (Jan 2015), https://perma.cc/48A8-P5HT (“a gallon of ethanol made from corn 
grown and processed in the Midwest will, under a microscope or other analytical device, look 
identical in every material way to a gallon of ethanol processed from sugar cane grown in Brazil. 
Both samples of ethanol will have the same boiling point, the same molecular composition, the 
same lower and upper limits of flammability—in other words, both will have identical physical 
and chemical properties because both products consist of 100 percent ethanol. On the other hand, 
the corn ethanol made from the Midwest will have different carbon intensity than the sugar cane 
ethanol from Brazil. Thus, the relevant inquiry with carbon intensity is not so much what is 
contained in a fuel, but how that fuel was made, distributed and used.”). 
73 Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-140 (2007). EISA’s relevant 
provisions amended the Clean Air Act by creating the Renewable Fuels Program as a subsection 
“o” of Section 211, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 7475(o).  
74 Debate over whether ethanols made from corn starch should qualify as “renewable fuels” has 
raged for years. BRENT D. YACOBUCCI & KELSI BRACMORT, CALCULATION OF LIFECYCLE 
GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS FOR THE RENEWABLE FUEL STANDARD 10–16 (Mar. 12, 2010), 
https://perma.cc/5F4Z-3FEC. 
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percent lower than those of gasoline.75 EISA also places a 15 billion-gallon cap, starting 
in 2015, on the annual volume of corn starch-based ethanol (such ethanol arguably 
meets the 20 percent threshold but never meets the 50 percent threshold), and makes an 
aspirational call for increased production of advanced biofuels from about 1.5 billion 
gallons in 2010 to 21 billion in 2022, when the RFS is set to expire.76 For 2017, EPA 
anticipates production of 312 million gallons of cellulosic ethanol (EISA calls for 5.5 
billion in that year) and 4 billion gallons of all advanced biofuels (EISA calls for 9.0 
billion).77 Since 2010, EPA has used its statutory authority under EISA to waive these 
EISA-prescribed production volumes for cellulosic biofuels, but not for advanced 
biofuels generally; biodiesel and Brazilian sugarcane-based ethanol have made up the 
difference.78  
 
2.6 Energy efficiency requirements 
                                                     
75 As California’s Air Resources Board has explained, the difference between ethanols for the 
purpose of a lifecycle emissions analysis is in how they came to be ethanol. CAL. AIR RESOURCES 
BD., STAFF REPORT: INITIAL STATEMENT OF REASONS FOR PROPOSED RULEMAKING--PROPOSED RE-
ADOPTION OF THE LOW CARBON FUEL STANDARD, at III-62 (Jan 2015), https://perma.cc/3D78-BW3D 
(“a gallon of ethanol made from corn grown and processed in the Midwest will, under a 
microscope or other analytical device, look identical in every material way to a gallon of ethanol 
processed from sugar cane grown in Brazil. Both samples of ethanol will have the same boiling 
point, the same molecular composition, the same lower and upper limits of flammability—in 
other words, both will have identical physical and chemical properties because both products 
consist of 100 percent ethanol. On the other hand, the corn ethanol made from the Midwest will 
have different carbon intensity than the sugar cane ethanol from Brazil. Thus, the relevant 
inquiry with carbon intensity is not so much what is contained in a fuel, but how that fuel was 
made, distributed and used.”). 
76 42 U.S.C. § 7475(o)(2)(B)(i)(II). 
77 Renewable Fuel Standard Program: Standards for 2017 and Biomass-Based Diesel Volume for 
2018; Proposed Rule, 81 Fed. Reg. 34778, 34780 (May 31, 2016). The National Research Council 
predicted this result in 2011. LESTER B. LAVE ET AL., NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, RENEWABLE FUEL 
STANDARD: POTENTIAL ECONOMIC AND ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTS OF U.S. BIOFUEL POLICY 2 (2011). 
78 See James H. Stock, The Renewable Fuel Standard: A Path Forward 9–10 (Apr. 2015) (tabulating 
difference between statutory volumes and volumes authorized by EPA rulemakings). 
Policy Interactions with a Carbon Tax 
 
Sabin Center for Climate Change Law | Columbia Law School 20 
[Type text] [Type text] [Type text] 
Federal energy efficiency (EE) laws have accumulated and been amended in fits 
and starts since 1975, 79  and now amount to a sweeping patchwork of mandates, 
incentives, and informational requirements, implemented through regulations issued by 
the Department of Energy (DOE), EPA, the Federal Trade Commission, and state 
governments. Thus while federal law addresses EE in buildings, industrial and 
commercial equipment, and consumer appliances, it often does so in fragmentary and 
indirect ways. 
Building codes remain the subject of state authority, and federal statutes do not 
impose EE performance requirements on commercial or residential buildings, new or 
existing. Instead, federal law provides several forms of encouragement—chiefly 
technical support, tax credits, and subsidies80—to various actors. The Energy Policy Act 
of 1992 imposes one of the few federal requirements in this area: state governments must 
certify that they have determined whether EE improvements would result from 
adoption of the current American Society of Heating Refrigerating, and Air-
Conditioning Engineers (ASHRAE) code for new commercial buildings, and of the 
Council of American Building Officials’ Model Energy Code for new residential 
buildings.81 If EE improvements would result, then state governments must adopt the 
                                                     
79 Energy Policy and Conservation Act, supra note 16; Energy Conservation and Production Act of 
1976, Pub. L. No. 94-385, 90 Stat. 1142 (Aug. 14, 1976) codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12, 15b; National 
Energy Conservation Policy Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-619, 92 Stat. 3206 (Nov. 9, 1978) codified as 
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 8201–8284 and 42 U.S.C. §§ 12, 15); National Appliance Energy 
Conservation Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100–12, 101 Stat. 103 (Mar. 17, 1987); Energy Policy Act of 
1992, Pub. L. No. 102-486, 106 Stat. 2777 (Oct. 24, 1992); Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 
1009-58, 119 Stat. 594 (Aug. 8, 2005); EISA; Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, 110–
343, 122 Stat. 3765; American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, 123 Stat. 
138. 
80 For a description of DOE’s technical assistance program, see DOE, Office of Energy Efficiency 
& Renewables, Building Energy Codes Program: State Technical Assistance, http://bit.ly/2aT7a7M 
(updated Apr. 2, 2015). As for tax incentives, subsidies from utilities to customers for EE 
improvements are not taxable, 26 U.S.C. § 136, and tax credits are available to homeowners who 
install qualified EE-improving building envelope components (e.g., windows or insulation), id. § 
25C(c), or heating or air conditioning equipment. Id. § 25C(d)(3). 
81 42 U.S.C. §§ 6833(a), (b). 
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updated version.82 Most states comply with this requirement, albeit at different paces; 
some states simply, it seems, do not comply. 83  The American Recovery and 
Reinvestment Act of 2009 provided a further push by conditioning receipt of State 
Energy Program (SEP) stimulus funds on each governor’s assurance that their state 
would pursue a bevy of measures to improve EE, including implementation of the most 
up to date energy code for residential and commercial buildings.84 All 50 governors 
provided such assurance and accepted receipt of SEP funds. 
The key example of federal law relevant to EE in appliances and equipment is 
the Energy Policy and Conservation Act (EPCA) of 1975, 85  which was revised 
significantly in 1987, 86  and amended by EISA in 2007. 87  It instructs DOE to adopt 
standardized assessments (“test procedures”) of energy use, water use (where relevant) 
and energy efficiency for “covered products,” 88  and also authorizes DOE to set 
performance standards for those products’ energy use based on the “maximum energy 
efficiency which is technologically feasible and economically justified.” 89  EPCA also 
instructs the Federal Trade Commission to issue a rule requiring disclosure via label of 
                                                     
82 Id. 
83 See DOE, Office of Energy Efficiency & Renewables, Building Energy Codes Program: Status of 
State Energy Code Adoption, http://bit.ly/1SktOCx (updated July 2016) (commercial tab shows 
adoption of ASHRAE 2013 / IECC 2015 code by 7 states, of 2010/12 code by 17 states and DC, of 
2007/09 code by 19 states, and of an earlier code or no code by 13 states; residential tab shows 
adoption of IECC 2015 or equivalent code by 4 states, 2012 by 10 states, 2009 by 27 states, and 
earlier or no code by 15 states). 
84 ARRA § 410(a)(2); see also e.g., Ted Strickland, Gov. of Ohio, Governor’s Assurance under 
ARRA Title VI, Section 410 (Mar. 23, 2009), http://bit.ly/2akEBjf.  
85 Energy Policy and Conservation Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94–163, 89 Stat. 871 (Dec. 22, 1975). 
86 National Appliance Energy Conservation Act of 1987. 
87 EISA §§ 142, 301, 303, 306–08, 310–12, 316, 321, 471, 531, 548. 
88
 42 U.S.C. § 6293(b)(3). Examples include: “(9) illuminated exit signs, (10) low voltage dry-type 
distribution transformers, (11) traffic signal modules and pedestrian modules, (12) medium base compact 
fluorescent lamps, (13) dehumidifiers, (14) commercial prerinse spray valves, (15) refrigerated bottled or 
canned beverage vending machines.” 
89 Id. § 6295. 
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“the range of estimated annual operating costs or other useful measure of energy 
consumption” for those products.90 EPCA applies these requirements to both consumer 
products and appliances as well as commercial and industrial equipment.91 The Energy 
Star program builds upon EPCA’s testing and reporting requirements, and encourages 
the purchase of energy efficient products and homes through voluntary certification and 
labeling.92 
2.7 Research and development funding 
Economic analyses generally detect underinvestment in R&D—sustainable 
energy technologies are no exception—because learning and new technologies are 
socially more valuable than private sector R&D spending would seem to imply. 93 
Standard economics explains this underinvestment as a “market failure” resulting from 
private entities’ inability to capture the full benefits of their R&D spending.94 Consistent 
with the logical remedy for this failure, the federal government supports R&D for nearly 
every type of energy source used in the U.S., as well as for technologies that could 
change how energy is transmitted, or that could capture CO2 emissions for 
sequestration or utilization. In fiscal year 2015, Congress appropriated $5.4 billion for 
R&D funded through DOE.95 Of that, $3.6 billion went to applied research: $1.9 billion to 
                                                     
90 Id. § (c)(2)(B). 
91 See 10 C.F.R. pt. 430 (listing performance standards for consumer products based on EPCA 
authority); 10 C.F.R. 431 (listing test procedures and performance standards for commercial and 
industrial equipment, e.g., commercial refrigerators, freezers and refrigerator-freezers; 
commercial warm air furnaces; distribution transformers; electric motors; and pumps).  
92 EnergyStar.gov, Origins & Mission, https://perma.cc/UZC9-G3X4 (accessed May 31, 2017). 
93 Darren Acemoglu, Introduction to Modern Economic Growth 411–432, 497–536 (2008). 
94 Id.; see also Fidel Perez-Sebastian, Market failure, government inefficiency, and optimal R&D policy, 
128 Economics Letters 43–47 (Mar. 2015) (explaining necessity and complementarity of both R&D 
funding and intellectual property protections in light of R&D market failures on the one hand 
and the inevitable inefficiency or “government failure” of public spending on R&D on the other). 
95 CBO, Federal Support for the Development, Production, and Use of Fuels and Energy 
Technologies 9 (Nov. 2015). 
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renewables and EE, $700 million to advanced nuclear, $600 million to fossil energy R&D 
(a category that includes both the development of methane hydrate for energy use and 
carbon capture, storage, and utilization (CCS/U)), and $100 million to electricity delivery 
and energy reliability.96  
2.8 Agriculture  
Two sorts of federal interventions are relevant here. First is the set of federal 
regulations that address GHG emissions, albeit indirectly, from agricultural sources. The 
U.S. GHG Reporting Program does not require agricultural sources of GHGs to submit 
complete GHG inventories; only emissions from manure management at large 
agricultural facilities must be reported to EPA. 97  Federal regulations do not restrict 
GHGs emitted by agricultural fields, pastures, livestock, facilities, or operations—
including concentrated animal feeding operations.98 The main federal regulatory means 
of addressing agricultural sources of GHGs are programs that provide technical 
assistance and modest financial support for ecosystem and resources conservation and 
for particular farming practices with lower environmental impacts. 99  The U.S. 
Department of Agriculture’s Building Blocks for Climate Smart Agriculture and 
Forestry, announced in 2015, is a characteristic set of approaches: they are voluntary, not 
                                                     
96 Id. 9 tbl.2. 
97 40 C.F.R. §§ 98.2 (listing criteria for entities subject to mandatory GHG reporting), 98.360–98.368 
(Manure Management), Appendix (animal population thresholds above which emissions must be 
reported: beef cattle, 29,300; dairy cattle, 3,200; swine, 34,100; poultry: layers, 723,600, broilers, 
38,160,000, turkeys, 7,710,000). 
98 See Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, U.S. Human Society v. EPA, Civil Action 
No. 15-cv-0141, (D.D.C. Jan. 28, 2015) (alleging EPA may no longer delay in responding to 
petitions for rulemaking to address GHGs and other emissions from CAFOs).   
99 These include the Conservation Reserve Program, the Conservation Stewardship Program 
(which includes Resource Conserving Crop Rotations program), the Agricultural Conservation 
Easement Program (includes Grassland and Wetland Reserve programs), and the Environmental 
Quality Incentives Program.  
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mutually contingent or coordinated, and modestly funded.100 One of those building 
blocks, “Livestock Partnerships,” dovetails with another voluntary program: EPA’s 
AgStar, which encourages farms to install anaerobic digesters to capture and extract 
GHGs (chiefly methane) from waste products, including manure.101 
The second federal intervention also gets at GHG emissions indirectly, but 
pushes in the other direction and does so on a massive scale. That intervention is the 
morass of farm subsidies that effectively encourage emissions-intensive modes and 
patterns of food production and consumption.102 This paper does not specify which 
subsidies are to blame or the mechanisms by which they encourage or fail to discourage 
the emission of GHGs from the growing and consumption of particular food, feed crops, 
or animals. It just notes that agriculture, narrowly defined, accounts for 9–10 percent of 
annual nationwide anthropogenic GHG emissions,103 that changes to what that sector 
produces and how could reduce those emissions substantially, 104  and that federal 
subsidies drive key decisions by farmers and others. 
2.9 State laws 
An exhaustive list of state-level laws and policies that would interact with a 
carbon tax is beyond the scope of this paper, but this sub-part addresses the most salient. 
Before describing those policies, it first summarizes briefly the legal limits imposed on 
                                                     
100 USDA, Building Blocks for Climate Smart Agriculture and Forestry (Apr. 2015), 
https://perma.cc/2Z3G-M968.  
101 EPA, AgSTAR: Biogas Recovery in the Agriculture Sector, https://perma.cc/F7YF-7U6P 
(updated Jan. 11, 2017). 
102 For a discussion of the emissions-intensity of several aspects of U.S. agriculture, see The White 
House, Climate Change and the Land Sector: Improving Measurement, Mitigation and Resilience 
of our Natural Resources (Dec. 2015), https://perma.cc/4GVH-S9ZL. 
103 EPA, Greenhouse Gas Emissions: Sources of Greenhouse Gas Emissions, https://perma.cc/8XES-
KWTV (updated Apr. 14, 2017); USDA Economic Research Service, Agricultural Production and 
Mitigation, http://perma.cc/9N5Z-GBHY (updated Oct. 14, 2016). 
104 See, e.g., Eva Wollenberg et al., Reducing emissions from agriculture to meet the 2 °C target, 22 
Global Change Biology 3859 (Dec. 2016), 
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/gcb.13340/epdf. 
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all of them by the Constitution’s dormant Commerce Clause (dCC) and Supremacy 
Clause.105  
The dCC, a corollary to the Commerce Clause inferred by courts, prohibits states 
from (a) discriminating against commerce because it originates in another state, (b) 
regulating commercial activity in other states, or (c) imposing an “undue burden” on 
interstate commerce. 106  This is not a blanket prohibition on all state laws affecting 
extraterritorial or interstate activities, however. Courts apply strict scrutiny only to 
regulations that expressly advantage intra-state products or services vis-à-vis extra-state 
competitors or that regulate activities wholly outside a state’s borders; they otherwise 
apply a balancing test to challenged laws and regulations.107  
Although courts begin a preemption analysis by presuming that federal law does 
not supersede the state law at issue, federal law preempts in all of the following 
circumstances:  
 Congress has declared that federal law occupies the whole of a given field; 
 Even if Congress has not declared a field of state law preempted, federal 
legislation in a given field is manifestly comprehensive and leaves no room for 
additions or specifications by states; 
 Again, even if Congress has not so stated, federal interests in a given field “are so 
dominant at the federal system will be assumed to preclude enforcement of state 
laws on the same subject,”108  
 State and federal law manifestly conflict, i.e., a state law presents an obstacle to 
Congress’s stated or implied objectives for a federal law or regulations 
                                                     
105 See generally Steven Ferrey, Carbon Outlasts the Law: States Walk the Constitutional Line, 41 Boston 
College Envtl. Affairs L. Rev. 309 (2014) (summarizing dCC in context at 313–19, and preemption 
by the Federal Power Act at 336–41). 
106 Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 325-26 (1979). 
107 See Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970) (articulating test). 
108 English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72 (1990) 
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implementing that law—a circumstance clearly evidenced by it being impossible 
for a private party to comply with both federal and state laws.109 
Not all of the policies discussed below butt up against the legal lines drawn by 
the dCC and the preemptive authority of the Federal Power Act and the Clean Air Act, 
but many have come close or been found to have overstepped those lines as states have 
sought to fill the void left by the federal government with respect to climate change 
mitigation policy.110 
Carbon pricing. California and the nine Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative 
(RGGI) states have assigned prices to GHG emissions using cap and trade schemes;111 
Oregon is exploring a similar scheme,112 and Washington State held a referendum on 
whether to adopt a carbon tax in November 2016.113 Since 2015, California’s cap and 
trade scheme has covered sources in California’s electricity, industrial, transportation, 
and natural gas sectors, which emit roughly 1.46 million tons of GHGs, 85 percent of the 
                                                     
109 E.g., Nantahala Power & Light Co. v. Thornburg, 476 U.S. 953, 969 (1986) (North Carolina 
utility commission’s electricity ratemaking conflicted with rates devised by Federal Energy 
Regulatory Commission pursuant to Federal Power Act). 
110 See Ferrey, supra note 104, at 309 (collecting and analyzing examples); Michael B. Gerrard, 
Federalism Obstacles to Advancing Renewable Energy, N.Y.L.J. 251(88), May 2014 (similar). 
111 California Air Resources Board, Assembly Bill 32 Overview (2016), https://perma.cc/3XET-
NVRG; see also Global Warming Solutions Act of 2006 (setting statewide emissions reduction 
target and directing California Air Resources Board to implement programs to achieve “the 
maximum technologically feasible and cost-effective GHG emission reductions” in line with that 
target); Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, Program Design, http://www.rggi.org/design/history; 
Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, Memorandum of Understanding (2005), 
https://perma.cc/EB4G-K37N. 
112 Oregon Department of Environmental Quality, Draft Outline: Market Mechanism for 
Reducing Greenhouse Gas Emissions in Oregon (June 3, 2016), https://perma.cc/UJL9-BCAC.  
113 Initiative Measure No. 732 (“Carbon Pollution Tax”) (filed Mar. 20, 2015), 
https://perma.cc/HE6S-BF9N; Carbon Tax Center, States: Washington, https://perma.cc/6G7K-
6ST3 (accessed May 24, 2017) (describing lead-up to and results of referendum, which defeated 
statewide carbon tax proposal). 
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state’s annual total.114 Notably, it is unclear whether current law authorizes the scheme 
to run beyond 2020.115 RGGI covers the 163 facilities located within RGGI-state borders 
that can generate at least 25 megawatts (MW) of electricity. In 2016, RGGI’s cap on those 
facilities’ emissions was 78.5 million tons of CO2 (about 1.1 percent of total U.S. 
emissions).116 The cap, which is currently slated to decline by 2.5 percent annually until 
2020, does not apply to other emissions, even from 25+MW facilities located in non-
RGGI states that generate electricity consumed in RGGI states. The price of a RGGI 
allowance for one short ton of CO2 emissions has fluctuated between $2.40 and $8.50 
since 2014; as of March 2017, the price was $3.00.117 A fraction of RGGI’s proceeds go to 
support for investments in renewable energy facilities, EE, and other climate change 
mitigation efforts in RGGI states.  
Both California’s scheme and RGGI allow for “leakage,” meaning that they 
neglect the emissions emitted beyond their borders as a result of activity within their 
borders.118 
Carbon-intensity restrictions. State laws also seek to restrict the carbon intensity of 
the electricity and transportation sectors by requiring the purchase of electricity or liquid 
fuels that meet particular standards. The most prevalent form for such restrictions is the 
Renewable Portfolio Standard (RPS), diverse forms of which have been adopted in 29 
                                                     
114 California Air Resources Board, Overview of ARB Emissions Trading Program (Feb. 2015), 
https://perma.cc/NNQ3-XHEW. 
115 Keith Goldberg, Calif. Cap-And-Trade Extension Poised For Legal Fight, Law360, July 14, 2016, 
https://perma.cc/RK32-JW3V; CARB statement (stating that no new legislative authority is 
needed to extend scheme to 2030). 
116 Calculation based on RGGI & US GHG Inventory (2015). 
117 See RGGI CO2 Allowance Tracking System, RGGI CO2 Budget Trading Programs: Transaction 
Price Report, https://perma.cc/H6JE-QD92; Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, Auction Results, 
https://www.rggi.org/market/co2_auctions/results (accessed May 24, 2017). 
118 California Air Resources Board, California cap-and-trade program, Resolution 12-51, Attachment A 
(Oct. 18, 2012) (creating safe harbors for leakage via “resource shuffling”). Danny Cullenward, 
How California’s carbon market actually works, 70 Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 1938 (2014). 
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states and the District of Columbia. 119  Generally—though no two RPSs are exactly 
alike—retail utilities subject to an RPS must purchase some percentage of the electricity 
they sell from renewable sources. States have set widely varying target percentages and 
dates: Hawaii mandates 100 percent renewable power by 2045, Vermont 75 percent by 
2032, and Pennsylvania 15 percent by 2020.120 In most RPS-states, utilities may meet that 
percentage requirement by purchasing either RE or Renewable Energy Credits (RECs) 
from renewable generators. In this way, RPSs amount to an indirect tax on fossil-fueled 
electricity generators and an indirect subsidy for renewable generators. 
Whereas RPSs require utilities to purchase minimum amounts of electricity from 
renewable generators, other more legally contentious approaches to have sought to limit 
carbon intensity by prohibiting electricity purchases from particular generators. 
Minnesota’s 2007 Next Generation Energy Act, for instance, which proscribed utilities 
from buying wholesale power from coal-fired facilities, was struck down by a federal 
court and that decision upheld on multiple grounds by the Eighth Circuit Court of 
Appeals.121  
New York’s Clean Energy Standard (CES) seeks to steer through these legal 
shoals of federalism while also propping up the finances of several in-state nuclear 
plants.122 It does not formally establish any prohibitions on eligible resources (to avoid 
dCC limits), nor does it expressly seek to rely on or affect wholesale electricity prices (to 
avoid conflicts with the Federal Power Act). Instead, the New York Public Service 
Commission has sought to assign value to the zero-emitting attribute of electricity 
generated by some “clean” sources (nuclear, hydro, and non-hydro renewables). That 
value is captured in Zero Emissions Credits (ZECs), whose price is derived from a 
                                                     
119 Galen Barbose, Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory, U.S. Renewables Portfolio Standards 
2016 Annual Status Report 5 (Apr. 2016), http://bit.ly/29Cl8s6.  
120 Id. 
121 N. Dakota v. Heydinger, 825 F.3d 912 (8th Cir. 2016). 
122 See Order Adopting a Clean Energy Standard, New York Public Service Commission, Case 
Nos. 15-E-0302, at 129–134 (Aug. 1, 2016). 
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formula whose variables include the SC-CO2, the price of RRGI allowances, and a collar 
that is based on wholesale electricity prices for one of the wholesale marketplace’s 
subregions. Whether the CES does in fact steer clear of these legal shoals is a question 
currently before the court.123 Illinois has also established a program that endows nuclear 
power plants with ZECs and requires other entities to purchase them in order to 
participate in the state’s retail electricity market.124 That program has, like New York’s, 
prompted litigation.125 
EE resource standards (EERSs) and utility rate decoupling. Like RPSs, EERSs require 
utilities to substitute a lower-emitting alternative for some amount of electricity 
generation. Unlike RPSs, EERSs require utilities to help their customers consume less of 
the utilities’ product, rather than pushing utilities to make or buy that product from a 
different source.126  
Legislation that directs public service commissions to decouple utility rates from 
volumes of energy sold aims to eliminate utilities’ incentive to simply build more 
capacity and sell more energy.127 In decoupled states, utilities receive compensation 
based on a set of performance measures,128 and so have less reason to prevent their 
customers from investing in EE and conservation efforts—indeed, in some states 
                                                     
123 See Joint letter from parties in Coalition For Competitive Electricity vs. Zibelman, et al., No. 16-
CV-8164 (VEC) to Judge Caproni (Dec. 8, 2016), https://perma.cc/S3QT-R2ED (complying with 
judge’s instruction to summarize issues in the case). 
124
 FEJA, Public Act 099-0906 (Dec. 7, 2016), https://perma.cc/HRK5-75CU. 
125 See State Power Project, Illinois: Commerce Clause and Supremacy Clause Challenge to 
Nuclear Zero Emission Credit Program, https://statepowerproject.org/illinois/ (accessed June 24, 
2017) (summarizing case, Electric Power Supply Ass’n v. Star, and providing links to pleadings). 
126 American Council for an Energy-Efficient Economy, State Energy Efficiency Resource 
Standards (EERS) (May 2016), http://bit.ly/2flob9c. 
127 Richard Sedano, Regulatory Assistance Project, Presentation: “The Basics of Decoupling, A 
Superior Solution to the Throughput Incentive and remarks on EE Performance Incentives NCSL 
Webinar,” at 8–10 (Feb. 12, 2015), http://bit.ly/2bkqMkO.  
128 See Janine Migden-Ostrande et al., Regulatory Assistance Project, Decoupling Case Studies: 
Revenue Regulation Implementation in Six States 3–6 (June 2014), https://perma.cc/HLF5-28UC 
(providing background on decoupling and description of challenges of measuring its effects). 
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support for such investments is among the performance measures that determine 
utilities’ compensation.129 
Property-Assessed Clean Energy (PACE) programs. PACE programs support EE 
investments on private property by addressing several impediments: a lack of 
information about contractors and the performance of EE investments, uncertainty about 
rates of repayment from prospective energy savings, and a lack of low-interest liquidity 
or suitable collateral for loans to pay for EE-boosting retrofits.130 Lawsuits over how 
PACE funding affected federally-backed mortgage loans interrupted nationwide 
adoption of PACE programs by all states,131 but such programs—for residential and 
commercial properties—persist and remain widespread.132 
Fossil fuel extraction regulations and severance taxes. In addition to regulating the 
carbon intensity of their electricity sectors, states also regulate aspects of the process of 
fossil fuel extraction and set severance tax rates to be charged for such extraction. States’ 
diversity in this regard has recently been illustrated by their disparate approaches to the 
regulation of unconventional hydrofracture drilling (“fracking”), which range from 
outright bans to the wholesale adoption of regulatory provisions drafted by the 
American Petroleum Institute or other oil and gas industry trade associations.133 There is 
less diversity in states’ approaches to coal mining, which must be consistent with 
                                                     
129 See id. at 35–36 (discussing complementary EE policies employed in case study states).  
130 For an overview of the logic and parameters of PACE programs generally, see American 
Council for an Energy-Efficient Economy, Property Assessed Clean Energy (PACE), 
https://perma.cc/HMC4-92AD (accessed June 1, 2017). 
131 Ian M. Larson, Keeping PACE: Federal Mortgage Lenders Halt Local Clean Energy Programs, 76 
Missouri L. Rev. 599 (2011). 
132 PACENation, C-PACE Market Update Q1 2016 (June 2016) https://perma.cc/8NTQ-PTWH 
(providing snapshot of financing for project on commercial properties flowing through 40 
operating PACE programs in 32 states and D.C.); PACENation, Residential PACE Near You, 
http://pacenation.us/pace-programs/residential/ (visited June 1, 2017) (showing locations of 
PACE programs nationwide).  
133 Amanda C. Leiter, Fracking, Federalism, and Private Governance, 39 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 107 
(2015).  
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provisions of the federal Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977—but, 
notably, that Act gives states “primacy” over implementation. 134  In addition to 
regulating drilling and mining for fossil fuels, state law also sets the rate at which such 
extractions are taxed. These rates vary widely and states adjust them actively. The 
feature of severance taxes most important to this paper’s inquiry is states’ reliance on 
them for revenue.135 
California’s Preemption Waiver Under the Clean Air Act. The Clean Air Act 
preempts state-level regulation of vehicular emissions to ensure that the national 
marketplace for automotive vehicles is not balkanized by diverse requirements.136 But 
the Act also instructs EPA to grant California a waiver of that preemption for more 
ambitious vehicular emissions standards that meet particular statutory criteria.137 The 
Act further permits other states to follow California’s lead once that waiver has been 
granted.138  Historically, this has meant that California’s standards have served as a 
harbinger of future CAFE standards. Under the Obama Administration, it meant that 
California regulators were directly involved in the development of national CAFE 
standards.139  At present, it means that the Trump Administration’s effort to reduce 
                                                     
134 95-87, 91 Stat. 445 (Aug. 3 1977), codified at 30 U.S.C. §§ 1201–1328; see also Bragg v. W. Va. Coal 
Ass'n, 248 F.3d 275, 289 (4th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1113 (Jan. 22, 2002) (contrasting 
SMCRA with “other cooperative federalism statutes”). 
135 U.S. EIA, Major fossil fuel-producing states rely heavily on severance taxes, Aug. 21, 2015, 
https://perma.cc/EU44-ZH4X (comparing severance tax revenues across mineral types and 
states). 
136 Clean Air Act § 209(a). 
137 Id. § 209(e). The most recent grant of a significant waiver related to the regulation of GHGs 
from vehicles was in 2013. California State Motor Vehicle Pollution Control Standards; Notice of 
Decision Granting a Waiver of Clean Air Act Preemption for California’s Advanced Clean Car 
Program and a Within the Scope Confirmation for California’s Zero Emission Vehicle 
Amendments for 2017 and Earlier Model Years, 78 Fed. Reg. 2,112 (Jan. 9, 2013). 
138 Id. § 177 (authorizing other states to copy California).  
139 See EPA, News Release: EPA and DOT Finalize Greenhouse Gas and Fuel Efficiency Standards 
for Heavy-Duty Trucks (Aug. 16, 2016), https://perma.cc/QF6Z-HMLL (“The agencies have 
worked closely with the State of California’s Air Resources Board in developing and finalizing 
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CAFE standards for 2022 to 2025 model years will fail if it cannot overcome—politically 
and legally—California’s commitment to the ambitious standards set on a preliminary 
basis in 2017. 
3 A ROUGH TYPOLOGY OF INTERACTIONS: COMPLEMENTARY, 
CONCURRENT, CONFLICTING 
This paper is not the first to consider interactions among environmental, energy, 
and climate-related policies, but its primary aim in describing those interactions is to 
highlight important potential policy tradeoffs in regards to a federal carbon tax and the 
risks that attend them—not just to add another typology of policy interactions to the 
pile. 140  This Part describes the categories in its typology, setting up Part 3, which 
describes how the policies summarized above are likely to interact with a federal carbon 
tax. It should be noted that this typology focuses on stakeholders and goals rather than 
on the agencies and institutions responsible for implementing particular policies. It is 
important to recognize that organizational and procedural features of policy interactions 
can make those policies relatively more likely to complement or conflict—for instance, 
EPA and FERC both concern themselves with natural gas, but they do so in pursuit of 
different statutorily-defined goals and by applying different procedures.141 However, 
                                                                                                                                                              
the standards. All three agencies are committed to the goal of setting harmonized national 
standards.”). 
140 See, e.g., Karoline S. Rogge & Kristin Reichardt, Policy mixes for sustainability transitions: An 
extended concept and framework for analysis, 45 Research Pol’y 1620 (2016) (reviewing “policy mix” 
literature from several fields: innovation studies, environmental economics, policy analysis, and 
strategic management); Sofia Simoes et al., A Tangled Web: Assessing overlaps between energy and 
environmental policy instruments along the electricity supply chain, 25 Envtl. Pol’y & Gov 439, 442 
(2015); V. Oikonomou & C. J. Jepma, A framework on interactions of climate and energy policy 
instruments, 13 Mitigation & Adaptation Strategies for Global Change 131 (2008), DOI 
10.1007/s11027-007-9082-9; OECD & IEA (2007); William M. Lafferty & Eivind Hovden, 
Environmental Policy Integration: Towards an Analytical Framework, 12 Envtl. Pol. 1 (2003). 
141 See Sofia Simoes et al., A Tangled Web: Assessing overlaps between energy and environmental policy 
instruments along the electricity supply chain, 25 Envtl. Pol’y & Gov. 439, 442 (2015). 
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this paper does not treat organizational and procedural features as an independent 
source of policy complementarity or conflict.  
3.1 Complementary 
Policies Complementary to a carbon tax do not just push toward the common 
ultimate goal of GHG emissions reduction, but push in places or to a degree that the 
carbon tax would not push anyway. Thus this paper considers policies to be 
Complementary if they (i) bring pressure or incentives to bear on actors and interactions 
by removing buffers that would absorb or deflect the pressure or informational signals 
created by a carbon tax; or (ii) intensify the effects or informational signals of a carbon 
tax to a material degree. In economist’s terms, this paper treats as Complementary 
policies that address a market failure or coordination problem other than the externality 
of climate change, or that materially improve the carbon tax’s response to that 
externality. The most important and frequently occurring examples of such failures are:  
 “network externalities”—a situation where the value of a product or 
service depends to a user on how many others also use that product or 
service;142 
 endemic underinvestment in basic research, learning by doing, and 
developing new technologies;143 and 
 underinvestment in energy efficiency (EE) owing to one or more of the 
following: imperfect information, principal-agent problems, asymmetric 
                                                     
142 Kenneth Gillingham & James Sweeney, Barriers to Implementing Low Carbon Technologies, 
Stanford-Resources for the Future Climate Policy Conference (Feb. 2012), 
http://stanford.io/2b00Fja (“a critical mass of consumers must adopt in order for the technology 
to become widespread.”). 
143 Joseph E. Stiglitz, Industrial policy, learning, and development, WIDER Working Paper 
2015/149, at 6 (Dec. 2015), https://perma.cc/9JV2-TGHW (“Markets, on their own, are not efficient 
in promoting innovation and learning”); David J. Teece, Intangible Assets and a Theory of 
Heterogeneous Firms, in Intangibles, Market Failure and Innovation Performance (Ahmed 
Bounfour & Tsutomu Miyagawa eds. 2015) (theorizing that firms exist largely because markets 
provide grossly insufficient incentives for acquisition and combination of intangibles such as 
technical knowledge). 
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information, split incentives, and behavioral failures such as bounded 
rationality.144  
A policy that makes smart meters widely available to electricity end-users 
would, for instance, be Complementary with a carbon tax. This is because the carbon tax 
would make the behavior changes and technological innovations supported by smart 
metering infrastructure more valuable and thus more likely to occur once that 
infrastructure was in place. However, the tax itself would not enable a private entity to 
reap adequate returns from creating that infrastructure.  
Another example of a Complementary policy addresses underinvestment in EE. 
A carbon tax might make future energy costs more predictable, but it cannot do the 
same for homeowners’ concerns that better home insulation will indeed yield material 
savings, or campus managers’ concerns that a facility-wide energy- and emissions 
budgeting and planning exercise will identify highly cost-effective opportunities to 
reduce energy consumption. Policies like PACE programs respond to those additional 
impediments by facilitating complex net present value calculations, reducing search 
costs for licensed contractors, and providing private property owners with access to 
financing.145 
3.2 Concurrent 
Whereas Complementary policies pursue the same ultimate goal by seeking to 
overcome different impediments, Concurrent policies apply more than one instrument 
not only to the same ultimate goal but to the same impediment. California’s AB 32, 
which authorizes both a suite of command-and-control policies and a cap-and-trade 
scheme, exemplifies this sort of interaction. As Professor Michael Wara has pointed out, 
                                                     
144 For a discussion of the key sources of this failure see Lisa Ryan et al., International Energy 
Agency, Energy Efficiency Policy and Carbon Pricing 12–16 (Aug. 2011). 
145 See generally DOE, Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy, Property-Assessed 
Clean Energy Programs, https://perma.cc/DR6G-LJQT (visited June 1, 2017). Thirty-two states 
and D.C. have passed legislation authorizing a PACE program. PACENation, List of all PACE 
enabling statutes by state (2016), https://perma.cc/XH6G-YA8X.  
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by compelling investments of the sort that carbon pricing might—or might not—inspire, 
the policy suite constrains compliance options while confusing and lowering the carbon 
price assigned by the cap-and-trade scheme.146 Meanwhile, by pricing carbon using a 
cap-and-trade scheme instead of a less cumbersome tax, the California Air Resources 
Board introduces heavy doses of complexity into the recipe for regulatory compliance. 
As a consequence, that scheme imposes all the costs of maintaining a carbon 
marketplace but does not yield the benefits of market actors deciding for themselves 
how to optimize emissions reduction strategies. 
This category of interaction comes with an important caveat: a policy that is 
Concurrent might nonetheless be invaluable for accomplishing the GHG emissions-
reduction goal of a carbon tax. That caveat is usefully illustrated by the fact that 
establishing a carbon tax would necessarily occur in at least two phases. The first phase, 
adoption, would end with legislation. The second phase, survival, would only end after 
the tax—like the income tax or gas tax before it—had become an enduring feature of 
federal tax policy.147 After that first phase but before the end of the second, Concurrent 
policies could serve as backstops or guarantees that emissions reduction efforts would 
proceed even if a change of political winds compromised the carbon tax shortly after its 
passage. 
3.3 Conflicting  
Conflicting policies are the easiest to spot. For instance, eliminating tax 
preferences for fossil fuel production would in several ways be the same as imposing a 
carbon tax: while the former uses the tax code to reduce the cost of extracting, refining, 
and selling sources of GHG emissions, the latter would use the tax code to increase the 
cost of emitting GHGs. One important nuance of this category relates to the decades-
                                                     
146 Michael Wara, California’s energy and climate policy: a full plate, but perhaps not a full 
model, 70 Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 26 (2014). 
147 This description borrows from the phases experienced by British Columbia’s carbon tax. See 
Kathryn Harrison, The Political Economy of British Columbia’s Carbon Tax, OECD 
Environmental Working Paper No. 63 (2013). 
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long lifespan of energy sector capital equipment and infrastructure. Thus a policy that 
encourages investment in natural gas-fired electricity generating capacity—instead of 
coal-fired capacity—could be considered Complementary to a carbon tax in the near 
term, but Conflicting in the longer term insofar as it locks in an energy source that will 
foreseeably become relatively emissions-intensive before the end of its useful life.  
3.4 A snapshot of the typology, applied 
The following table depicts the application of this paper’s typology in condensed 
form. Several of the policies mentioned above fit into more than one category. Part 4 
does not discuss all of the policies included in this table. 
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Table 1.  Interactions typology 
Sector Complementary Concurrent Conflicting 
Fossil fuel 
production 
 State severance taxes Fossil fuel tax 
preferences 
  Leases for extraction 




Leases for extraction 
from federal lands 
in the absence of 
widely available 
CCS/U technologies 
    
Electricity  Clean Air Act § 
111(d) 
 
 Clean Air Act § 111(b) 
if tax is low 
Clean Air Act § 111(b) 
if tax is high 
Clean Air Act § 
111(b) if NSPS is 
poorly specified 
 CSAPR, MATS, etc. if 
benefits are not double-
counted 
  
 EERS Clean Air Act § 115  
 R&D for renewables, 
EE, grid 
improvement 
PTC, ITC  
 Nuclear liability and 
waste subsidies 
RPSs, CESs  
  AB 32 (cap-and-trade 
component); RGGI 
 
    
Transportation CAFE (including Cal. 
waiver) 
CAFE (including Cal. 
waiver) 
 
 RFS2 (per EISA);  
California LCFS 
 RFS1 (per Energy 
Policy Act of 2005) 
  Gas tax  
 Hybrid, PHEV, EV 
subsidies 
  
    
Agriculture Resource conservation 
programs 
NO2 regulation under 




    
Built EE requirements,   
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environment subsidies, if benefits 
are not double-counted 
 State PACE programs   
    
CCS/U R&D for CCS/U Clean Air Act § 111(b)  
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4 IMPORTANT POTENTIAL TRADEOFFS 
This section considers several potential tradeoffs that might accompany adoption 
of a carbon tax. Its selections reflect the relative importance of tradeoffs in terms of GHG 
volumes and economic impact.  
4.1 The “cascade” of regulations based on the Clean Air Act 
The question preliminary to categorizing GHG regulations based on the Clean 
Air Act is this: could the “cascade” be segmented, or would negotiators need to take or 
leave that body of regulations as a whole? Under current law, segmentation is not 
allowed: nothing in the statute authorizes EPA to ignore pollutants if the Act addresses 
their source—a point that EPA has been loath to acknowledge in relation to emissions 
from aircraft and CAFOs. 148  But because a carbon tax would be adopted through 
legislation, such legislation could also amend the Clean Air Act to allow EPA to 
continue implementing some but not all of the “cascade” regulations. Thus the answer 
to the preliminary question is “Yes, legislatively.” The potential segments considered 
here are (1) Section 111(b); (2) Section 111(d); (3) Section 115; (4) the PSD program; (5) 
Section 202, addressing road-based mobile sources and implemented using CAFE 
standards; and (6) Section 231, addressing aircraft.  
4.1.1 Section 111(b): Possibly Complementary, Concurrent, or 
Conflicting 
The New Source Performance Standards (NSPSs) called for in this section of the 
Act prescribe technologies that new construction (or modification) of a given source type 
                                                     
148 Aircraft endangerment finding; ABJ ruling denying M2D rest of case re undue delay on 
aircraft emissions; Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Center for Biological 
Diversity v. EPA, 1:16-cv-00681-ABJ (D.D.C.) (Apr. 12, 2016) (“1. EPA has delayed unreasonably 
in (1) issuing an “Endangerment Finding” for aircraft determining that carbon dioxide (CO2) 
emitted by aircraft engines causes or significantly contributes to air pollution which may 
reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare; and (2) promulgating regulations 
limiting such emissions. 2. Plaintiffs petitioned EPA to issue the endangerment finding and 
promulgate standards in 2007. EPA’s delay in this matter so far exceeds eight years.”); Complaint 
for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, U.S. Human Society v. EPA, Civil Action No. 15-cv-0141, 
(D.D.C. Jan. 28, 2015) (alleging EPA may no longer delay in responding to petitions for 
rulemaking to address GHGs and other emissions from CAFOs).  
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must incorporate into its design to accomplish EPA-specified emission reduction goals. 
(Notably, adoption of a particular NSPS incidentally sets a minimum performance 
standard for BACT applicable to that source category.149) In contrast to a carbon tax, 
these standards deprive the developer of that source of at least some options for 
complying with emissions reduction targets. What this means for trading off depends on 
the tax rate, the particular BACT, and the emissions that would result from one or the 
other. Changes to these factors—iterated in the bullets below—could make it 
appropriate to categorize NSPSs as Complementary, Concurrent, or Conflicting with a 
carbon tax.  
 Complementary 
A low tax rate that would not push, say, a new gas-fired power plant to install 
CCS/U unless a NSPS required such installation, would make that NSPS 
Complementary with the tax. Whereas the tax would only correct for the climate 
change externality over the long term, the NSPS would correct for the externality 
over the short term. 
NSPS would also arguably be Complementary for a source type granted an 
exemption from the carbon tax on the grounds that it faces international 
competition from sources unencumbered by a carbon tax. 
 Concurrent 
A tax rate set high enough to push all source categories to install CCS would 
make NSPS for a given stationary source category Concurrent, and merely a 
cause for additional transaction costs, rather than a cause of materially different 
activities, investments, or emissions levels.  
 Conflicting 
A NSPS that steered a particular facility away from installing an innovative and 
promising non-BACT technological option, or toward an outmoded or ill-
conceived option, would potentially conflict with a carbon tax, insofar as it 
prevented adoption of an optimal approach to GHG emissions reduction. EPA’s 
acceptance in the 1970s of tall smoke stacks as a means of pollution control is one 
example of this sort of error.150 
                                                     
149
 42 U.S.C. § 7479(3); see also EPA, PSD and Title V Permitting Guidance for Greenhouse Gases 20–21 
(Mar. 2011), https://perma.cc/UYD3-UCE4.  
150 Richard L. Revesz & Jake Lienke, Struggling for Air: Power Plants and the “War on Coal” 85–
86 (2016). 
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This discussion of NSPS highlights the crucial importance of the tax rate, the 
prospect of exemptions, and the expected useful lifespan of a given facility to any 
tradeoff between NSPS and a carbon tax. 
4.1.2 Section 111(d): Concurrent 
The performance standards for GHG emissions imposed on existing stationary 
sources, with the key exception of existing EGUs, generally fit the same pattern as that 
described above for NSPSs. Existing EGUs are exceptional because of how EPA has 
drafted the Clean Power Plan, discussed in Part 2.1 above. 
The Clean Power Plan and a carbon tax would not be Complementary. The Clean 
Power Plan addresses the same climate change externality as would be addressed by a 
carbon tax, but not in a way that would amplify the price signal sent by a carbon tax. 
Indeed, notwithstanding EPA’s best efforts, the Clean Power Plan is a Rube Goldberg 
device that would route incentives through an elaborate system of federal- and state-
level institutions and requirements and bring those incentives to bear on just one 
subsector of the economy. By contrast, a carbon tax would deliver the same basic 
incentive without the intermediaries, constraints, and transaction costs of command-
and-control regulations. 
It is difficult to find a reason to consider the Clean Power Plan as other than 
Concurrent with a carbon tax. As explained further in Part 5, below, this categorization 
should not be read to imply that the Clean Power Plan would be made wholly redundant 
and dispensable by a carbon tax: in the international context in particular, it could 
provide an important source of credibility in future negotiations over climate change 
mitigation commitments. But a Concurrent categorization does reflect that the Clean 
Power Plan is not likely to accomplish the primary aim of emissions reduction better 
than a carbon tax and further that it would restrict options a carbon tax would make 
available to regulated entities. 
4.1.3 Section 115, International Air Pollution: Concurrent 
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Clean Air Act Section 115’s interaction with a carbon tax is difficult to 
characterize, as the language of the statute is broad and no regulation has been drafted 
to implement it. A Section 115 program could be drawn up in a way that closely 
resembles the Clean Power Plan, in some respects, though it would also potentially be 
simpler and broader in scope.151 It would also likely be a highly contentious regulatory 
approach, and one that would not target market failures other than those addressed by a 
tax. Thus, this paper categorizes a potential regulation based on Section 115 as 
Concurrent.  
4.1.4 PSD program: Complementary or Concurrent 
EPA’s application of the PSD program to GHG emissions would be either 
Complementary or Concurrent with a carbon tax. It would be Complementary if two 
conditions obtain: the tax is set low enough not to prompt inclusion of CCS/U in the 
design of new facilities in attainment areas, and EPA identifies CCS/U as BACT for those 
facilities. In such a situation, the PSD program would address a short-term externality 
not already addressed by the tax. If either of these conditions does not obtain, however, 
then the PSD program would duplicate some, but not all, of the effects of a tax, and 
would not create additional effects supportive of climate change mitigation. Here again, 
however, while Concurrent operation would incur some avoidable costs, these would 
not be for nothing: they would “buy” retention of the authority to make up for a weak or 
exemption-riddled tax through a command-and-control backstop.  
4.1.5 Section 202, CAFE standards: partly Complementary, partly 
Concurrent 
The automotive sector, which is responsible for about 27 percent of U.S. GHG 
emissions,152 must follow particular technological pathways if it is to maintain growing 
                                                     
151 See Michael Burger et al., Legal Pathways to Reducing Greenhouse Gas Emissions Under Section 115 
of the Clean Air Act, 28 Geo. Envtl. L. Rev. 359, 362 (2016). 
152 EPA, Sources of Greenhouse Gas Emissions: Transportation Sector Emissions, 
https://perma.cc/MJF8-6RGJ (last updated Apr. 14, 2017). 
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transport volumes without exceeding the available emissions “budget.” 153  These 
pathways entail one or more basic departures from the fossil-fueled internal combustion 
engine, such as electrification (for light-duty and passenger vehicles), hydrogen fuels 
(for heavy-duty vehicles), and replacement of structural steel with carbon fiber to 
radically reduce vehicle weights.154 Hewing to these pathways will require changes on 
both the demand and supply sides of the transportation sector, and vehicle 
manufacturers will only take the necessary risks if regulatory policy both pushes and 
protects them—a combination that can theoretically be accomplished by carefully 
imposing requirements that simultaneously require risky investments and prevent 
opportunistic risk-avoidance by competing firms.155 
Since 2011, pursuant to provisions of several statutes (i.e., the Clean Air Act as 
interpreted in Massachusetts v. EPA, EISA, and the Alternative Motor Fuels Act of 
1988 156 ), CAFE’s goals have included climate change mitigation, 157  “reduc[ing] oil 
consumption,” 158  and “encourage[ing] early adoption and introduction into the 
                                                     
153 Deep Decarbonization Pathways Project, Pathways to Deep Decarbonization: Executive 
Summary 3–4, 49–51 (2015).  
154 Chris Gearhart, National Renewable Energy Laboratory, Implications of sustainability for the 
United States light-duty transportation sector, 3 MRS [Materials Research Society] Energy & 
Sustainability: A Rev. J. 1 (2016); Anant D. Vyas et al., Transportation Energy Futures Series: 
Potential for Energy Efficiency Improvement Beyond the Light-Duty-Vehicle Sector, DOE/GO-
102013-3706 (Feb. 2013), https://perma.cc/U3YB-2ZZF.  
155 See Stefan Ambec et al., The Porter Hypothesis at 20: Can Environmental Regulation Enhance 
Innovation and Competitiveness?, 7 Review of Environmental & Economic Policy 2, 4 (2013) 
(examining evidence supporting and challenging hypothesis that regulatory requirements can 
overcome market failures by pushing firms to make risky but profitable investments in new 
technologies, as first articulated by Michael Porter & C. van der Linde, Toward a new conception of 
the environment-competitiveness relationship, 9 Journal of Economic Perspective 97 (1995)). 
156 Pub. L. No. 100-494, 102 Stat. 2442 (Oct. 14, 1988). 
157 76 Fed. Reg. at 74,963 (“2. Why is EPA proposing this Rule? a. Light Duty Vehicle Emissions 
Contribute to Greenhouse Gases and the Threat of Climate Change”). 
158 Id. at 74,854. 
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marketplace of advanced technologies to dramatically improve vehicle performance.”159 
The program has implemented these goals by imposing both fuel economy and GHG 
emissions reduction requirements on U.S.-made vehicle fleets, as well as “additional 
incentives” to encourage the adoption of new technologies. Notably, although EPA and 
the National Highway Transportation Safety Agency have worked to harmonize the 
program’s GHG-reduction and fuel-economy targets, those targets remain formally 
discrete.160 In addition to these legal points, the following empirical points are relevant 
to the formulation of tradeoffs between CAFE and a carbon tax: 
 The CAFE program has induced technology adoption at a rate faster than the 
“natural” rate at which the automotive sector would otherwise have 
incorporated new fuel- and energy-efficiency improvements;161 
 The penetration of new technologies has yielded significant emissions intensity 
reductions in U.S.-made vehicle fleets162 and—indirectly—in the Asian-made 
fleets that have long been marketed to U.S. consumers as relatively fuel-
efficient;163 
                                                     
159 Id. at 75,339. 
160 In addition, although NHTSA has been authorized to set fuel economy standards since the 
1970s, only since EISA’s passage has it been required to do so, and to “maximum feasible” levels. 
Pub. L. 110–140, title I, §§  102, 104(b)(1), 121 Stat. 1498, 1503 (Dec. 19, 2007), codified at 49 U.S.C. § 
32902(a), (f). That requirement for passenger and light duty vehicles expires in 2030. Id. § 
32902(b)(2)(B). 
161 Antonio M. Bento et al., The Impact of CAFE Standards on Innovation in the US Automobile 
Industry, No. 206195, 2015 AAEA & WAEA Joint Annual Meeting, July 26-28 (2015), San 
Francisco, California, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, https://perma.cc/P4RL-
JCCE (“show[ing] that the changes in the rate of innovation is proportionate to the changes in the 
CAFE standards”).  
162 U.S. EPA, U.S. Department of Transportation, and California Air Resources Board, Draft 
Technical Assessment Report: Midterm Evaluation of Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas 
Emission Standards and Corporate Average Fuel Economy Standards for Model Years 2022-2025, 
EPA-420-D-16-900 [hereinafter TAR 2016], at 3-2, 3-3, 3-12 (July 2016); EPA, Greenhouse Gas 
Emission Standards for Light-Duty Vehicles Manufacturer Performance Report for the 2013 
Model Year, EPA-420-R-15-008a (Mar. 2015), https://perma.cc/GL9R-CQ8Z (reporting that 
manufacturers consistently exceeded standards).  
163 Bento et al., supra note 155, at 9–10. 
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 Compliance with CAFE standards applicable through 2025 is expected to force 
manufacturers to either tradeoff between efficiency and horsepower or to avoid 
sacrificing horsepower by making vehicle fleets that are on average smaller and 
lighter;164 
 As EPA itself acknowledged, crediting manufacturers with increments of CAFE 
compliance for the sale of alternative fuel vehicles—battery-powered, 
compressed natural gas, flex-fuel, and others—has sacrificed average emissions 
intensity for technology adoption.165 Whether this is an efficient means of 
encouraging alternatives to the tradition internal combustion engine remains an 
open empirical question;166 
 EISA revised the CAFE program to allow trading of credits for compliance not 
only within corporate fleets (e.g., between car and light truck models) but also 
among manufacturers;167 this is expected to prompt over-compliance by at least 
some manufacturers;168 
                                                     
164 Id. at 12 (“Our simulation of innovation under the new aggressive CAFE standards suggest 
that automakers will have to do moderate downsizing to meet the 2025 target in cars, and they 
only need minor downsizing in trucks . . . . This is a much more optimistic prediction than 
previous studies have shown.”); Christopher R. Knittel, Automobiles on Steroids: Product Attribute 
Trade-Offs and Technological Progress in the Automobile Sector, 101 American Economic Review 3368 
(2011) (finding that maintaining historic rate of CAFE-driven efficiency gains will require 
downsizing vehicles). 
165 75 Fed. Reg. at 62,811 (“EPA believes it is worthwhile to forego modest additional emissions 
reductions in the near term in order to lay the foundation for the potential for much larger ‘game-
changing’ GHG emissions and oil reductions in the longer term.”); see also Alan Jenn et al., 
Alternative Fuel Vehicle Adoption Increases Fleet Gasoline Consumption and Greenhouse Gas Emissions 
under United States Corporate Average Fuel Economy Policy and Greenhouse Gas Emissions Standards, 
50 Environmental Science & Technology 2165 (2016), https://perma.cc/7CHB-XAJC.  
166 National Research Council, Cost, Effectiveness, and Deployment of Fuel Economy 
Technologies for Light-Duty Vehicles 345 (2015) (“This incentive may drive additional 
deployment of PEVs. But this may not be the most cost-effective way to increase the number of 
alternative fuel vehicles in the long run.”); Sanya Carley et al., Rethinking Auto Fuel Economy 
Policy Technical and Policy Suggestions for the 2016-17 Midterm Reviews 45–47 (Feb. 2016), 
https://perma.cc/VZ6Q-ZT6E (recommending critical examination of programs encouraging 
purchase of zero-emission vehicles). 
167 Id. at 342–43 (describing credit trading for MY2017-2025). 
168 Virginia McConnell, The New CAFE Standards, Are They Enough on Their Own?, Resources for 
the Future Discussion Paper No. 13-14, at 10 (May 2013), https://perma.cc/764T-H7U7. 
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 In addition to prompting supply-side changes, CAFE has promoted consumer 
concern for fuel economy;169 but 
 Improvements in fuel economy are partially offset by drivers driving more—a 
“rebound effect.”170 
The foregoing suggests several complementarities between CAFE and a carbon 
tax. One relates to “rebound,” which CAFE’s efficiency-promoting design cannot avoid, 
but which a carbon tax would likely frustrate, both by raising fuel costs and by 
heightening drivers’ awareness of those costs. 171  Another relates to the “additional 
incentives” CAFE can provide to manufacturers for making risky investments in 
technologies that depart radically from historical norms. A carbon tax imposed on fuel 
producers, refiners, and importers would provide a general pressure to reduce or 
altogether avoid fuel consumption, but would not duplicate the more targeted 
incentives available to EPA, via CAFE, to reward risky but promising design changes. 
Indeed, their combination would likely prevent the sort of tradeoff EPA made for the 
sake of encouraging “potential game-changing” longer-term results. 172  A third 
complementarity is the labeling required by the CAFE program.173 Even if the CAFE 
program ceased imposing requirements related to GHG emissions, it could continue to 
require that manufacturers report clearly and consistently their vehicles’ performance in 
                                                     
169 Seung-Pyo Jun et al., A study on the effects of the CAFE standard on consumers, 91 Energy Policy 
148–160 (2016). 
170 TAR 2016, supra note 155, at 10-9 to 10-20. 
171 See Kathryn Harrison, The Political Economy of British Columbia’s Carbon Tax, OECD 
Environmental Working Paper No. 63 (2013) (describing how drivers’ lower rate of fuel 
consumption after imposition of carbon tax was disproportionately higher than comparable 
changes in fuel prices due to market fluctuations). 
172 See Valerie J. Karpus et al., Should a vehicle fuel economy standard be combined with an economy-
wide greenhouse gas emissions constraint? Implications for energy and climate policy in the United States, 
36 Energy Economics 322, 327, 331 (2013) (noting that availability of EVs is highly significant to 
success of ambitious emissions constraints). 
173 See Revisions and Additions to Motor Vehicle Fuel Economy Label; Final Rule, 76 Fed. Reg. 
39,478 (July 6, 2011);  
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terms of GHG emissions and thereby encourage comparison by customers eager not to 
pay the avoidable costs of fuel and a carbon tax.  
By contrast, the imposition of GHG emissions reduction requirements roughly in 
line with the SC-CO2 via CAFE standards would be Concurrent with a carbon tax. This 
Concurrent interaction is especially ripe for a tradeoff because the CAFE-based 
approach would likely be less efficient than a carbon tax at incorporating the climate 
change externality into the price paid for emissions from driving. 174  Importantly, 
however, such a tradeoff could eliminate only the component of the CAFE program 
focused on reducing vehicles’ CO2 emissions, leaving other program elements to persist, 
including fuel economy standards, implemented by NHTSA in service to the goal of 
reducing oil consumption and thereby serving energy efficiency and security goals, and 
incentives that focus on “game-changing” GHG-reducing technology adoption rather 
than just incremental improvements. Making this tradeoff would require attending to 
the CAFE program enforcement authority currently available to NHTSA and EPA for 
their respective standards. Whereas NHTSA is authorized only to impose modest fines 
for non-compliance, EPA is authorized to rescind authorization to sell motor vehicles for 
non-compliance with GHG emissions requirements.175 Negotiators would have to decide 
whether mothballing or eliminating the GHG emissions portion of the CAFE program 
would also mean abandoning EPA’s stronger degree of enforcement authority, or 
transferring that authority to NHTSA. 
4.2 Non-GHG Clean Air Act regulations: Complementary 
As noted above, air pollution regulations that address the direct adverse effects 
of air pollution on public health and welfare have not only led (incidentally) to 
significant GHG emissions reductions, but EPA has counted some of those reductions as 
co-benefits in its cost-benefit analyses of GHG regulations. But for that counting of co-
                                                     
174 See Karpus et al., supra note 166, at 327–28, 331 (observing that fuel tax is far more efficient than 
fuel economy standard for purpose of affecting rate of fuel consumption). 
175 Benjamin Leard & Virginia McConnell, Nearly Tripled CAFE Fine Highlights Differences in 
EPA and NHTSA Rules, Resources for the Future, July 25, 2016, https://perma.cc/ZY4M-2D3Q. 
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benefits using the SC-CO2, such regulations would be wholly Complementary rather 
than Concurrent with a carbon tax. Both impute the costs of adverse impacts on public 
health and welfare to emissions from many of the same sources, but one targets criteria 
pollutants or HAPs that sicken people and ecosystems when emitted into the ambient 
air, and the other targets climate change, an intermediate link in the causal chain 
connecting adverse impacts to emissions. Because the adverse effects resulting from 
non-GHG and GHG emissions occur largely independently,176 they are rightly treated as 
distinct externalities that happen to result from many of the same sources of pollution. 
Thus, the only valid tradeoff between non-GHG air pollution regulations and a carbon 
tax would relate to counting—and not double-counting—their respective benefits. 
4.3 Tax preferences and subsidies for energy 
This sub-part considers interactions with federal support for the three types of 
energy noted above: fossil fuels, renewables, and nuclear power. 
4.3.1 Fossil fuel production: Conflicting 
That the conflict between subsidizing fossil fuel production through tax 
preferences and taxing GHG emissions is direct does not make its resolution simple. The 
largest fossil fuel tax preferences are not uniquely available to that sector—indeed, as 
noted above, renewable power generators benefit from the domestic manufacturing 
deduction as well.177 Thus simply “trading off” their elimination for a lower carbon tax 
                                                     
176 Some adverse effects are not independent but synergistic. For instance, higher ambient 
temperatures means that ozone precursors more readily form ozone, such that the same volume 
of pollutants yields a larger volume of harmful air pollution. However, while these synergistic 
effects are likely material in many instances, they are relatively small and sufficiently difficult to 
quantify that this paper treats does not take them into account. 
177 Metcalf, supra note 59, at 3 (“The oil and gas industry argues that these three provisions should 
not be classified as tax preferences because such tax treatment is not unique. For example, a 
percentage depletion deduction can also be taken by firms producing other nonrenewable 
resources, like coal, timber, or minerals. Similarly, the industry points out that the [Intangible 
Drilling Costs] expensing deduction resembles the research and development tax deduction that 
firms in other industries can use. Finally, the domestic manufacturing deduction applies to a 
wide swath of industries—most of which can claim a 9 percent deduction rather than the limit of 
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rate would mean adding a new carve-out to the tax code rather than eliminating a tax 
preference. For several reasons, this approach is less likely to accompany adoption of a 
carbon tax than a more encompassing overhaul of tax code provisions. 
Whether or not this tradeoff would be part of a larger deal, its negotiation would 
certainly entail weighing proponents’ key arguments in favor of these conflicting tax 
code provisions: for defenders of fossil fuel tax preferences, energy security; for carbon 
tax advocates, climate change mitigation and federal tax revenue. With this weighing in 
mind, Professor Metcalf has estimated how repeal of the three largest tax preferences for 
oil and gas would affect oil and gas drilling activity, production, prices, and 
consumption.178 He found that repeal would have material effects on drilling, but only 
modest effects on production, prices, and consumption. 179  As for GHG emissions 
impacts, Professor Metcalf estimates that repeal would likely yield less than a 1 percent 
reduction.180 In contrast to these negligible direct effects on energy security and climate 
change, Professor Metcalf notes that two other effects would be highly significant: first, 
repeal would yield roughly $4 billion in tax revenue annually;181 and second, it would 
greatly strengthen the U.S.’s leadership role vis-à-vis other G20 governments that have 
lately balked at actually making the fossil fuel subsidy reductions they committed to in 
                                                                                                                                                              
6 percent for oil and gas—making it the third largest corporate tax expenditure by the federal 
government.”). 
178 Metcalf, supra note 59, at 1 (accounting for about 90 percent of the roughly $4.5 billion annually 
recovered by the oil and gas sector from tax preferences). 
179 Specifically, he projects the following results: (i) lower rates of drilling in the near term: 9 
percent for oil, 11 percent for gas; (ii) lower rates of domestic production in the long term: 5 
percent for oil, 3-4 percent for gas; (iii) higher prices over the long term: 1 percent for oil (global) 
and 7-10 percent for gas (domestic); and (iv) lower rates of consumption over the long term: less 
than 1 percent (global) for oil and 3-4 percent (domestic) for gas. 
180 Id. at 18. 
181 Id. at 19. 
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2009.182 In sum, he finds that repeal would have limited direct effects on energy security 
and climate change mitigation, but substantial fiscal effects. 
4.3.2 The PTC & ITC: once Complementary, but increasingly 
Concurrent 
Tax credits for renewable energy installations and a carbon tax both encourage 
participants in the electricity sector to transition from fossil-fueled to non-emitting 
resources. When Congress first adopted the PTC as part of the Energy Policy Act of 
1992, it would arguably have suited this paper’s “complementary” category well: 
integrating intermittent renewable resources then presented significant technical 
challenges183 and the regulatory thickets of the electricity sector—home of powerful 
incumbents and conservative officials—meant high barriers to entry.184 Tax credits did 
not just close a gap between the price charged by GHG-emitting generation and 
renewables, but bolstered renewable generators as they supplied power, worked to 
undo the technical and institutional knots that limited grid integration, and developed 
viable business models through trial and error.185 Even if renewables are not yet fully 
competitive with traditional electricity generation in all jurisdictions, they certainly are 
no longer fledgling technologies,186 nor are renewables businesses still explorers of an 
                                                     
182 Id.; Compare G20 Leaders' Statement, The Pittsburgh Summit, September 24–25, 2009, para. 24 
(2009), https://perma.cc/JP97-2H9H (“To phase out and rationalize over the medium term 
inefficient fossil fuel subsidies while providing targeted support for the poorest.”), with G20 
Energy Ministerial Meeting Beijing Communique, Final draft 4am 29th June 2016, at 7–8 (2016), 
https://perma.cc/T5QP-SZF3 (reporting no agreement as to deadlines or quantitative targets for 
phase-out). 
183 See, e.g., Pavlos S. Georgilakis, Technical challenges associated with the integration of wind 
power into power systems, 12 Renewable & Sustainable Energy Reviews 852 (Apr. 2008); Paul 
Denholma & Robert M. Margolis, Evaluating the limits of solar photovoltaics (PV) in traditional 
electric power systems, 35 Energy Pol’y 2852 (May 2007). 
184
 See Benjamin K. Sovacool, Renewable Energy: Economically Sound, Politically Difficult, 21 Elec. J. 18 
(June 2008). 
185 See Felix Mormann, Requirements for a Renewables Revolution, 38 Ecol. L.Q. 903 (2011) 
(surveying myriad barriers to entry and arguing that carbon pricing would not overcome them). 
186 Camila Stark et al., Joint Institute for Strategic Energy Analysis, Renewable Electricity: Insights 
for the Coming Decade 8 (Feb. 2015), https://perma.cc/UK8W-2UYG (illustrating that ranges of 
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unmapped frontier.187 As such, tax credits increasingly serve the same purpose as a 
carbon tax would—crediting renewables for generating power without emitting 
GHGs—only less efficiently: the National Academies of Sciences calculated in 2013 that 
roughly $250 in tax revenue are lost for each ton of carbon reduced via the facilities 
incentivized by the PTC or ITC.188 (For comparison, the federal government’s estimate 
for the SC-CO2 in 2015 ranged from $11 per ton (at a 5 percent discount rate) to $56 (at a 
2.5 percent discount rate).)   
Did the PTC and ITC ever serve a materially different purpose than a carbon tax, 
or were they merely a politically attainable alternative when first implemented?189 The 
question is valuable not because it can be answered with certainty, but because it 
illustrates that the PTC and ITC have arguably migrated from the Complementary to the 
Concurrent category, making them better candidates for a carbon tax tradeoff than they 
were at their inception. Put another way, repeal of the PTC and ITC today would likely 
be offset by the price-equalizing effects of a carbon tax. 
4.3.3 Subsidies for nuclear: Complementary 
Subsidies for liability and waste disposal related to nuclear power generation, 
whatever their effective amounts, fit within this paper’s Complementary category for 
straightforward reasons: they address impediments independent of those leading to the 
externality of climate change, and their support of nuclear contributes to the supply of 
                                                                                                                                                              
levelized cost of entry of competing generation sources varies across US jurisdictions); id. at 42 
(“The fundamental driver of rapid renewables deployment in the United States is that cost 
improvements are making renewable power generation cost competitive with fossil fuels.”). 
187 See, e.g., Lars Strupeit & Alvar Palm, Overcoming barriers to renewable energy diffusion: business 
models for customer-sited solar photovoltaics in Japan, Germany and the United States, 123 J. of Cleaner 
Production 124 (June 2016); Erik Funkhouser et al., Business model innovations for deploying 
distributed generation: The emerging landscape of community solar in the U.S., 10 Energy Research & 
Social Sci. 90 (Nov. 2015). 
188 NAS, supra note 8, at 70. 
189 For a discussion of the tendency to regulate with less efficient “carrots” instead of more 
efficient “sticks” in the environmental policy context, see Brian D. Galle, The Tragedy of the Carrots: 
Economics & Politics in the Choice of Price Instruments, 64 Stan. L. Rev. 797 (2012). 
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low- or zero-emitting electricity. That categorization should not be mistaken as a blanket 
endorsement of the subsidies that support the existing nuclear fleet’s operation, but it 
can rightly be understood as indicating that those subsidies do not duplicate the effects 
of a carbon tax and so are not natural candidates for tradeoff.  
4.4 Gas tax: Concurrent in the short-term, potentially Conflicting 
thereafter 
The existing gas tax performs a revenue raising function and a user fee 
function—though political unwillingness to raise its rate has lately kept it from yielding 
a user fee sufficient for highway upkeep. If the gas tax rate were increased to a level that 
imputed the SC-CO2 to gasoline and diesel sales, it would arguably function as a 
corrective to the externality of climate change. Crucially, however, these functions are 
not fully compatible beyond the short-term: if the gas tax were raised to a level that 
incentivizes significant GHG emissions reductions, then it will also reduce fuel 
consumption over the medium- to long-term (i.e., as drivers invest in substitutes for 
vehicles powered by an internal combustion engine), and thereby reduce revenues—
whether those revenues are treated as user fees for the highway system or just flow to 
the federal government’s General Fund. This would not be improved by imposing a 
carbon tax as well as a gas tax. If the carbon tax rate is high enough to discourage drivers 
from emitting GHGs over the medium- to long-term, then it will undermine the 
revenue-raising functions of the gas tax. That is, the two would initially be Concurrent—
using similar instruments to create similar pressures—and eventually Conflicting. 
Notably, in keeping with the parameters articulated by the Deep Decarbonization 
Pathways Project, this scenario assumes the development and widespread commercial 
availability of alternatives to fossil-fuel emitting motor vehicles. 
What does this mean for a potential tradeoff? It suggests that a tradeoff could 
proceed in phases, whereby a gas tax (Concurrent with a carbon tax) or carbon tax 
(wholly replacing the gas tax) would initially impute the SC-CO2 to gasoline and diesel, 
and would incrementally be supplemented and eventually supplanted by some other 
revenue source—should gasoline and diesel consumption disappear through sector-
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wide decarbonization.190 Importantly, the second phase could be entirely contingent, 
treating the replacement of the gas tax with a carbon tax as a simple tradeoff with no 
predetermined end-date. 191  This sort of contingency could make the carbon tax 
indispensable quickly, but could also build in pressure to prevent incremental increases 
in the tax rate.  
4.5 Federal RFS: Complementary with respect to advanced biofuels, 
Conflicting with respect to corn starch ethanol 
Like the CAFE program, the RFS is meant to serve the related goals of reducing 
the U.S. transportation sector’s dependence on petroleum, reducing GHG emissions 
incident to transportation, and—intermediate to both of those in the long term—
facilitating technological and infrastructural developments in support of biofuels’ 
substitution for conventional gasoline. While all biofuels are arguably substitutes for 
gasoline, the 10 percent blend wall limits the amount of possible gasoline substitution 
and effectively requires different biofuels to compete for shares of that 10 percent. Also, 
as noted above, different biofuels have very different lifecycle emissions profiles: 
ethanol derived from corn starch improves marginally on gasoline, cane ethanol emits at 
most half as much, and biodiesel and advanced biofuels perform better still. 
RFS support for biofuels with lifecycle emissions comparable to gasoline would 
conflict with a carbon tax in much the same way as tax preferences for fossil fuel 
extraction: taxpayers would pay twice for a canceled effect. EISA’s 15 billion-gallon cap 
on production of such biofuels reflects Congress’s awareness that high-GHG biofuels 
                                                     
190 Parry and Small propose a third option: replace the gas tax with a “mileage tax” that satisfies 
the need for a user fee and will not erode amid decarbonization of the transportation sector. Ian 
Parry & Kenneth A. Small, Implications of carbon taxes for transportation policies, in Implementing a 
US Carbon Tax, Challenges and debates 211, 221–22 (Ian Parry et al. eds. 2015). 
191
 Cf. Gas Tax Replacement Act of 2015, https://perma.cc/M49T-HVZT (proposing repeal of excise tax on 
gasoline and diesel and replacement with carbon tax).  
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arguably conflict with climate change mitigation goals, and serve only the goal of energy 
security.192 
RFS support for advanced biofuels, whose GHG emissions profiles are at least 50 
percent lower than that of conventional gasoline, could be Complementary with a 
carbon tax. This is true even though (i) the tax would push in the same direction as the 
RFS by making biofuels more cost-competitive relative to standard gasoline based on 
their respective emissions’ profiles; and (ii) advanced biofuels would themselves be 
subject to the tax. Complementarity in spite of these features would owe to the tax being 
inadequate to overcome key impediments to the development of advanced biofuel 
production technology and distribution networks. On the other hand, the tax would 
only be Complementary with the RFS if the RFS proves capable of overcoming these 
impediments, which it has yet to do.193 This paper has no recommendations for changes 
to the RFS, but notes that the biofuels currently subject to it differ from one another in 
basic ways: cane-based fuels can be produced cost-effectively on a relatively large scale, 
but rely on imports, chiefly from Brazil; cellulosic fuels do not rely on imports but 
cannot yet be produced cost-effectively in large quantities; biodiesel does not face the 10 
percent blend wall that limits other biofuels, but producing biodiesel costs substantially 
more than producing petroleum-based diesel, in large part because oil prices are 
currently very low. These differences cause each biofuel to collide with different market 
                                                     
192 See James H. Stock, The Renewable Fuel Standard: A Path Forward 19 (Apr. 2015). However, 
the RFS’s effect on energy security has been the subject of debate. Analyses that observe a drop in 
the international price of oil as a result of biofuels production suggest that, by promoting a 
“rebound” effect, the RFS undermines its goal of averting oil consumption by making oil cheaper 
to consume. See Madhu Khanna & Xiaoguang Chen, Economic, Energy Security, and Greenhouse Gas 
Effects of Biofuels: Implications for Policy, Am. J. Ag. Econ., June 2013, at 2–3 (discussing empirical 
evidence showing that “[b]y reducing the demand for oil, these policies could lower the world 
price of oil, and lower the consumer price of gasoline and blended fuel in the United States and 
lead gasoline consumption to rebound positively and to decrease by less than the energy 
equivalent increase in biofuel consumption.”). This is not an inevitable feature of policies that 
promote biofuels: unlike the RFS quantity mandate, the blend mandate codified in California’s 
low carbon fuel standard (LCFS) will tend to reduce fuels’ overall GHG-intensity while raising 
their price, and therefore will generally not result in rebound. Id. at 3. 
193 Stock, supra note 191, at 4 (recommending basic changes to RFS). 
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failures—for instance, biodiesel is hobbled by network externalities (chiefly the chicken-
and-egg problem of filling stations carrying biodiesel), cellulosic ethanol by persistent 
technical incapacity.  
4.6 Energy efficiency requirements: Complementary 
Of all the interactions considered in this paper, the one examined most 
thoroughly elsewhere is that of a carbon tax and EE. Indeed, in 2011 the International 
Energy Agency addressed precisely the question of whether EE policies (e.g., labeling 
requirements, informational tools, and performance standards) bear upon the same 
sources of market failure (e.g., principal-agent problems, unavailable energy 
performance information, bounded rationality) as a carbon tax.194 Based upon a review 
of relevant empirical literature, they conclude that EE policies and carbon pricing 
overlap very little in the sources of market failure they address but are both highly 
effective in relation to those sources.195 The authors note that they do overlap in relation 
to information problems—a carbon tax makes it more valuable for end-users to learn 
about the same information that EE policies require to be disclosed—but that even this 
overlap is likely to be a source of synergistic effects rather than redundancy.196 These 
observations hold for both appliances and buildings and their equipment systems.  
4.7 R&D for CCS/U: more Complementary than Concurrent 
There is a clear overlap between efforts to develop CCS/U technologies that make 
it possible to reduce or avoid GHG emissions and adoption of a carbon tax that makes it 
more expensive to emit GHGs. That overlap is not complete however: a carbon tax 
would do little or nothing for developers of Direct Air Capture technologies that filter 
CO2 from the ambient air—unless Direct Air Capture installations were treated as a 
                                                     
194 Ryan et al., supra note 143, at 23–25 (examining question in relation to appliances), 32–33 
(buildings). 
195 Id. at 23, 32. 
196 Id. at 24 (“Better information can thus facilitate [EE] improvements, and policies to increase 
information can enhance the effectiveness of price signals,” such as a carbon tax would send to 
consumers). 
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source of CO2 tax credits. Furthermore, private sector investments in R&D for CO2 
CCS/U technologies suffer from the classic market failure that affects nearly all R&D: 
private entities underinvest for lack of assurance that they will capture most or all of the 
returns from their investments. One might argue that adoption of a carbon tax and 
continued application of general R&D tax preferences to CCS/U technologies would 
address both of the market failures relevant to CCS/U technology development, making 
additional CCS/U R&D subsidies duplicative. However, because many CCS/U 
technologies are still at pre-commercial stages of development,197 and because of the 
urgent need to reduce emissions from existing and new fossil-fueled power plants in 
particular, further intervention is justified.198  
4.8 State policies 
The state policies that would interact with a carbon tax are diverse; their 
interactions would also be diverse. Common to them all, however, are the legal 
parameters discussed in Part 2.9 above relating to the dormant Commerce Clause (dCC) 
and federal preemption flowing from the Supremacy Clause. Also relevant, though not 
common to all states, is California’s special status under the Clean Air Act as a 
designated regulatory pioneer.199  
4.8.1 Carbon pricing: Concurrent 
A federal carbon tax would duplicate in several basic respects state laws that 
assign prices to GHG emissions: both would be adopted to correct for the externality of 
                                                     
197 See generally International Energy Agency, Technology Roadmap: Carbon capture and storage 
2013 edition (2013), https://perma.cc/E6FZ-E2H7.  
198 For a fuller articulation of this point in relation to renewable energy technology more 
generally, see Richard G. Newell, The Role of Energy Technology Policy Alongside Carbon Pricing, in 
Implementing a US Carbon Tax, supra note 189, at 179–190; see also Robert N. Stavins, Repairing 
the R&D Market Failure, The Evntl. Forum, Jan./Feb. 2011, at 16, (describing the “R&D market 
failure” and observing that “[e]mpirical analyses have repeatedly verified the crucial point that 
combining carbon-pricing with R&D support is more cost-effective than adopting either 
approach alone.”). 
199 Clean Air Act § 209(b). 
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climate change and would affect some or all of the same prices passed on to consumers 
by firms in the oil, gas, and electricity sectors. This duplication of both purpose and 
instrument is a logical basis for a tradeoff. This point cannot be separated from two 
significant caveats, however. First, state-level carbon pricing would not so much 
duplicate as provide additionality to a federal carbon tax (the same would not be true of 
a federal cap-and-trade scheme).200 Particular states—likely those that have implemented 
carbon pricing already—might pursue that additionality after concluding that the 
federal tax does too little to help them achieve their climate change-related goals. The 
second caveat is that a state-federal carbon pricing tradeoff would not just generalize 
and homogenize mechanisms that currently exist in a minority of states, but would also 
redirect tax receipts from state to federal coffers and thereby deprive state-level energy 
transition policies of an important source of revenue.201  
Unlike some of the regulatory mechanisms discussed below, existing state 
carbon pricing schemes have steered clear of the legal limits mentioned above (though 
they have faced a number of legal challenges on other grounds).202 This owes in part to 
the fact that both California’s cap-and-trade scheme and RGGI have not taken measures 
to eliminate their emissions “leakage,”203 meaning that they do not prevent actors subject 
                                                     
200 L.H. Goulder & Robert N. Stavins, Challenges from State-Federal Interactions in US Climate Change 
Policy, 101 American Economic Review 253–257 (2011) (anticipating “100% leakage” from a 
combination of state and federal cap-and-trade schemes). 
201 See, e.g., John Myers, Almost $391 million in cap-and-trade dollars awarded to public transit projects 
across California, L.A. Times, Aug. 16, 2016, https://perma.cc/8FPM-HQ26; Regional Greenhouse 
Gas Initiative, Investment of RGGI Proceeds Through 2013 (Apr. 2015), https://perma.cc/8HC6-
XNHA.  
202 For a tabulated list of recent climate change and energy cases dealing with this issue, including 
several dealing with AB 32 and RGGI, see State Power Project, State Cases, http://bit.ly/2aZzx5l 
(visited May 31, 2017). 
203 Justin Caron et al., Leakage from sub-national climate policy: The case of California’s cap-and-trade 
program, 36 Energy Journal 167–190 (2015); Harrison Fell & Peter Maniloff, Beneficial Leakage: 
The Effect of the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative on Aggregate Emissions, Colorado School of 
Mines Division of Economics and Business Working Paper 2015-06 (June 2015), 
https://perma.cc/968B-KZZU (estimating that 10 percent of energy demand shifted to sources 
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to their emissions caps from purchasing from sources located beyond the capped region 
and thereby causing those sources to emit.204 
4.8.2 Other carbon-intensity restrictions: Complementary or 
Concurrent 
This paper cannot address the full array of state-law restrictions on carbon 
intensity, even though they will all interact with a carbon tax. Instead, it considers a 
handful of important and characteristic examples: California’s Low Carbon Fuel 
Standard (LCFS); RPSs, such as exist in 29 states and the District of Columbia; and New 
York’s newly minted Clean Energy Standard. Notably, these have already been or are 
expected to face legal challenges. 
California’s LCFS: Complementary and legally secure. One component of AB 32’s 
implementation requires a 10 percent reduction in the carbon intensity of all motor 
vehicle fuels supplied or sold in California by 2020.205 The California Air Resources 
Board expects that this will be accomplished by blending standard gasoline with ethanol 
or by replacing petroleum-based diesel with biodiesel. As with the federal RFS, the 
LCFS’s requirements are directed at impediments to low-emissions ethanol production, 
distribution, and use in a more targeted way that a carbon tax would be, and thus are 
Complementary with a federal carbon tax. Furthermore, unlike the RFS, the LCFS does 
not put downward pressure on oil prices and thereby invite rebound. 
                                                                                                                                                              
outside RGGI, but that this shift was beneficial to net emissions because it substituted gas sources 
outside of RGGI states for coal sources located in RGGI states). 
204 See Shelley Welton et al., Regulating Imports into RGGI: Toward a Legal, Workable Solution, 
Sabin Center for Climate Change Law White Paper (Aug. 2013) (proposing means by which 
RGGI could reduce leakage while yet avoiding violation of the dCC). 
205 Producers and importers have complied by blending lower-emitting ethanols with standard 
gasoline. The California Air Resources Board’s life cycle emissions analysis of blended fuels takes 
into account the energy source used for ethanol production as well as the emissions resulting 
from transport of the fuel from the site of production to sale. Ethanols produced in the Midwest, 
even if they were chemically identical to ethanols produced in California, receive higher 
emissions ratings because their production draws to a greater degree on coal-fired power plants 
and they traveled farther. 
Policy Interactions with a Carbon Tax 
 
Sabin Center for Climate Change Law | Columbia Law School 59 
[Type text] [Type text] [Type text] 
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals determined that the LCFS did not overstep 
the bounds of the dCC and was not preempted by the Clean Air Act.206 That decision 
“reconfigure[d] the past century of Supreme Court interpretation of the [dCC]” in two 
respects: it made environmental goals a valid basis for restricting commerce entering the 
state; and it downgraded discrimination based on product origin from a per se dCC 
violation to something to be weighed by the Pike v. Brace Church balancing test.207 For 
this paper’s purposes, the decision shifts the burden (in the context of a tradeoff 
negotiation) to the party wishing to argue that a carbon tax should preempt an LCFS 
such as California has adopted, which, as of now, stands on solid legal ground. 
RPSs: Concurrent and often legally susceptible. Several economic analyses 
characterize RPSs as likely to interact in a Concurrent fashion with a carbon tax, and to 
be less efficient for the purpose of encouraging renewable generation while 
discouraging emissions-intensive generation. Rausch and Reilly (2013) describe the 
combination of RPSs and a carbon tax as “redundant” in terms of their effects on 
emissions, and note also that RPSs would reduce carbon tax revenues by directing 
money from emitting generators to renewable generators (in payment for RECs) instead 
of the federal Genreal Fund.208 Burtraw and Palmer (2013) find that RPSs push in the 
same direction as a carbon tax but would tend to muddy the signal sent by the tax 
                                                     
206 Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey, 730 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 2013), rehearing en banc denied, 
740 F.3d 507 (2014), cert. denied, 134 S.Ct. 2875 (2014). Similar, if less specific and exacting, 
requirements for shipping were also upheld by the Ninth Circuit. Pac. Merch. Shipping Ass'n v. 
Goldstene, 639 F.3d 1154 (9th Cir. 2011) (rejecting arguments based on the Commerce Clause and 
field preemption against Vessel Fuel Rules, Cal. Code Regs. tit. 13 §2299.2(b)(F) (2016), which 
mandate that vessels operating within 24 nautical miles of California's coast “use cleaner marine 
fuels in diesel and diesel-electric engines, propulsion engines, and auxiliary boilers”) 
207 Ferrey, supra note 104, at 328. 
208 Sebastian Rausch & John Reilly, Carbon taxes, deficits, and energy policy interactions, 68 Nat'l Tax. 
J. 157, 163 (2015). 
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regarding the “cost” of CO2-intensity for particular generation sources.209 Furthermore, 
RPSs generally do not raise—and can even lower—electricity prices, inviting rebound.210  
In addition to these inefficiencies relative to a carbon tax, RPS legislation often 
includes preferences for in-state (or in-region) energy sources or RECs. 211  These 
preferences discriminate against out-of-state sources in ways that make RPSs susceptible 
to challenge based on the dCC.212 This susceptibility amounts to a strong legal indication 
that RPSs depart from the unfettered marketplace that the dCC is generally understood 
to preserve.213 
New York’s Clean Energy Standard: more Complementary than a RPS, but still 
Concurrent; also, legally at risk. The CES adopted by New York’s Public Service 
                                                     
209 Dallas Burtraw & Karen L. Palmer, Resources for the Future, Mixing It Up: Power Sector 
Energy and Regional and Regulatory Climate Policies in the Presence of a Carbon Tax, RFF DP 
13-09, at 14 (Apr. 2013), https://perma.cc/CL2J-P7PP.  
210 Carolyn Fischer, When do renewable portfolio standards lower electricity prices?, 31 Energy J. 101–
120 (2010). 
211 Brannon P. Denning, Environmental Federalism and State Renewable Portfolio Standards, 64 Case 
Western Law Review 1519, 1531–33 (2014); see also Anne Havemann, Surviving the Commerce 
Clause: How Maryland Can Square Its Renewable Energy Laws with the Federal Constitution, 71 Md. L. 
Rev. 848 (2012) (proposing options for making Maryland’s RPS robust to dCC challenges). 
212 For an example of a case not actually adjudicated, but that a state quickly resolved through a 
settlement, see Complaint, TransCanada Power Marketing Ltd. v. Bowles, No. 4:10-CV-40070 (D. 
Mass.) (alleging dCC violation for program mandating long-term renewable power purchase 
agreements with in-state providers). That settlement exempted the plaintiff from compliance 
with Massachusetts’ Green Communities Act of 2008, and the state legislature removed the in-
state preference in 2012. Mass. Acts of 2012, Ch. 209 §§ 35 & 36 (amending Green Communities 
Act § 83 and inserting § 83A); see also Harvey Reiter, Removing Unconstitutional Barriers to Out-of-
State and Foreign Competition from State Renewable Portfolio Standards: Why the Dormant Commerce 
Clause Provides Important Protection for Consumers and Environmentalists, 36 Energy Law Journal 45, 
59–61 (2015) (describing dCC jurisprudence as inferring—rightly or wrongly—the Framers’ 
intent for the Commerce Clause as preservation of a market unfettered by parochial restrictions 
or protections). 
213 Harvey Reiter, Removing Unconstitutional Barriers to Out-of-State and Foreign Competition from 
State Renewable Portfolio Standards: Why the Dormant Commerce Clause Provides Important Protection 
for Consumers and Environmentalists, 36 Energy L.J. 45, 59–61 (2015) (describing dCC jurisprudence 
as inferring—rightly or wrongly—the Framers’ intent for the Commerce Clause as preservation 
of a market unfettered by parochial restrictions or protections). 
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Commission in August 2016 is slightly more Complementary with a carbon tax than the 
RPSs discussed above, but not enough to shift it out of this paper’s Concurrent category. 
The key distinctions between a standard RPS and New York’s CES are these: the CES 
effectively designates only some (but not all) nuclear generators as sources of Zero 
Emissions Credits (ZECs; the CES equivalent of RECs), and it sets the price of those 
ZECs using a formula based in part on the SC-CO2.214 
Thus, whereas a RPS is an indirect tax on fossil-fueled generation and an indirect 
subsidy to renewable generation at rates susceptible to program parameters and 
electricity market fluctuations, New York’s CES is an indirect tax on GHG emissions (a 
close proxy for fossil-fueled generation) and an indirect subsidy to the three nuclear 
power plants in the state with ailing financial profiles. The CES otherwise shares most of 
the features that lead economists to criticize RPSs as both inefficient tools for climate 
change mitigation and redundancy with the price effects of a carbon tax. However, the 
example of the CES highlights that state policy tradeoffs in pursuit of a carbon tax will 
almost certainly have fateful implications for nuclear generators’ financial health, which 
increasingly relies on state-level efforts to assign a value to zero-emitting generation and 
to thereby limit the effects of cheap natural gas on revenues that might otherwise flow to 
nuclear generators.  
4.8.3 EE Resource Standards and electricity rate decoupling: 
Complementary 
This pair of policies shares a basic goal with, and would have similarly 
Complementary interactions with a federal carbon tax. Their goal—correcting for 
existing regulatory institutions’ undervaluing of EE and energy conservation by —is one 
that a carbon tax would support incidentally but not directly. That is, even though a 
carbon tax would increase the price of some fuels used to generate electricity and 
                                                     
214 New York Public Service Commission, Order Adopting a Clean Energy Standard, Case No. 15-
E-0302, at 51 (Aug. 1, 2016) ( “ZEC Price = Social Cost of Carbon (average for each Tranche) - 
Baseline RGGI Effect (fixed at $10.41/short ton) - Amount by which sum of Zone A Forecast 
Energy Price and ROS Forecast Capacity Price exceeds $39/MWh.”). 
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average electricity prices in the near- and medium-term, it would not thereby change the 
basic formula used by public utility commissions to decide what costs regulated utilities 
may recover. Rather, it would only change a subset of the inputs for a single variable in 
that formula. By contrast, EE Resource Standards and decoupling revise the formula’s 
basic logic by removing incentives to overspend on generation and transmission 
capacity and adding incentives to value EE, even though utilities cannot “sell” EE to 
their customers. 
4.8.4 PACE programs 
The points made above in Part II.A about market failures affecting EE and in Part 
II.F about the complementarity of a carbon tax with policies designed to address those 
failures, apply with equal force in relation to PACE programs for both residential and 
commercial property owners. In short, these programs’ goal of facilitating EE 
investments promises synergistic rather than duplicative implications for GHG 
emissions and economic costs. 
5 IMPORTANT RISKS ATTENDING POTENTIAL TRADEOFFS 
Having identified interactions between existing policies and a federal carbon tax 
that should inform how one might be traded off for the other above, this part notes 
briefly how particular tradeoffs could present risks to the basic goal of a carbon tax, 
namely climate change mitigation.215 
Mistaking the relationship between a carbon tax and tax preferences for fossil fuels. If tax 
preferences for fossil fuels are to be part of a tradeoff made in pursuit of political 
agreement on a carbon tax, then the proper subject of that tradeoff is not the incidence or 
rate of the tax, but availability of tax preferences to all sources of energy, fossil or 
renewable. Put another way, as repealing fossil fuel tax preferences would not reduce 
                                                     
215 Cf. Paul Twomey, Rationales for Additional Climate Policy Instruments Under a Carbon Price, 23 
Econ. & Labor Relations Rev. 7, 12 (2012); Samuel Fankhauser et al., Combining Multiple Climate 
Policy Instruments: How Not to Do it, 1 Climate Change Econ. 209 (2010). 
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the SC-CO2, an offer to repeal them should not be treated as somehow counterbalancing 
the need for a carbon tax, in whole or in part.  
Trading efficiency for political susceptibility. While it is axiomatic that a carbon tax 
would, in the abstract, achieve emissions reductions more efficiently than Concurrent 
command-and-control regulations, it is also true that U.S. tax policy is rife with 
exceptions, loopholes, and complexities, and that the political economy of 
environmental regulation tends to favor subsidies—including tax preferences—over 
simple excise taxes.216 Thus, one risk of adopting a carbon tax in trade for existing 
command-and-control regulations is that the tax should be or become compromised by 
waivers, exceptions, or simple repeal such that it does not materially improve on the rate 
and level of emissions reductions achievable by the regulations it replaced.  
To mitigate this risk, negotiators could provide for a period of transition during 
which entities subject to command-and-control regulations were deemed to be in 
compliance so long as the tax collected revenues within prescribed tolerances and 
measures of emissions intensity demonstrated the tax’s effectiveness. That period could 
end either the rescission of those regulations or with their indefinite dormancy. 
Abandoning Concurrent policies en toto, even their Complementary components. As 
mentioned in Part 2.1 of this paper, the Clean Air Act operates fundamentally on the 
basis of what scientific understanding reveals about relationships between air pollution, 
the environment, and public health. That is, EPA cannot legally ignore new scientific 
evidence that existing air pollution regulations fail to protect public health. Thus, 
trading Clean Air Act regulations for a carbon tax would risk departure from this rubric 
in favor of one that gives Congress a freer hand to adjust key features of the tax in 
response to political pressures and in spite of scientific evidence. The most obvious 
feature that Congress might seek to adjust (or fail to adjust) is the tax. This illustrative 
example gets at a more general risk: that negotiators fail to ensure that key components 
of a Concurrent policy (re)appear in the carbon tax that replaces it. 
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To mitigate this risk in relation to the particular example noted here, negotiators 
could incorporate an institutional feature of the Clean Air Act into the carbon tax 
regime: something like the Clean Air Scientific Advisory Committee, which does not 
make policy, but updates estimates of levels at which particular forms of pollution can 
be considered safe. Alternatively, and more simply, negotiators could include a 
legislative provision that tethers the tax rate to the SC-CO2, as determined by a National 
Academies of Sciences panel, a reconstituted Interagency Working Group on the Social 
Cost of Carbon, or some other appropriate body.217 
Miscounting costs and benefits. This risk is two-fold. On the one hand, there is a 
risk of over-counting the climate-related benefits of a regulation and under-counting its 
costs. This could result from failing to adjust the cost-benefit calculation conducted by 
the Office of Management and Budget pursuant to Executive Order 12,866 to be 
consistent with a regulatory and economic landscape altered by the presence of a carbon 
tax. On the other hand, there is also a risk of simply ignoring climate-related benefits 
and over-counting the costs of a regulation on the grounds that a carbon tax—whatever 
its rate or scope—makes its purported benefits redundant and its costs duplicative. No 
proposal to address one of these risks should ignore the other.  
Ignoring complementarity. It is not difficult to imagine the desire to cut 
government spending or to alleviate a particular industry of its regulatory burdens 
leading members of Congress to insist that “all options” be placed on the negotiating 
table when discussing a carbon tax. One aim of this paper is to explain that while there is 
a principled basis for insisting on negotiation of tradeoffs between a carbon tax and 
Concurrent or Conflicting emissions and energy-related policies, there is little principled 
basis for insisting on extinguishing Complementary policies through tradeoff. EE 
performance and labeling requirements are perhaps the clearest example of a 
                                                     
217 Cf. Marc Hafstead et al., Adding Quantity Certainty to a Carbon Tax Through a Tax 
Adjustment Mechanism for Policy Pre-Commitment, 41 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 41 (2017) 
(proposing a somewhat more elaborate but also more secure set of standards and 
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Complementary policy whose trading off would sacrifice synergies rather than creating 
efficiencies. Another example is R&D to develop CCS/U technologies. 
Too much preemption. Myriad institutional dampers can impede the transmission 
of price signals—such as would be sent by a federal carbon tax—to actors at the state 
and local levels. As Burtraw and Palmer (2015) observe: 
In a unitary model of government, the introduction of a price signal is 
assumed to be transmitted instantly to decision makers at all levels of 
government so that permitting, land use planning, and other functions of 
government adjust accordingly. * * * But there is in fact little research to 
indicate how well this would occur. There are many reasons to think that 
price signals may not be transmitted efficiently through levels of 
government. * * * Even if a tax is used efficiently, it may not work as 
described in the conventional economic model. In particular, it may not, 
and we think it most certainly will not, affect all relevant margins of 
decision making in the economy from consumer behavior to the decisions 
of state and local governments.218 
This caveat weighs against making field preemption the mechanism of a tradeoff 
for a carbon tax in several policy contexts. Field preemption of, say, state-level 
supplements to federal carbon pricing, low carbon fuel standards, or EE resource 
standards, would undermine policies that could perform synergistically with a carbon 
tax.  
Too little preemption. Just because some state policies can provide synergistic 
complements to a carbon tax does not mean that the existing tangle of Concurrent RPSs 
should continue absorbing indirect subsidies while adding complexity to investors’ 
understanding of renewables versus competing sources of electricity generation. RPSs’ 
relative imprecision, inefficiency, programmatic diversity, and parochialism all weigh in 
favor of a tradeoff with a carbon tax. One option for a tradeoff would couple adoption of 
the tax with adoption of a federal RPS that expressly preempts state RPSs. Rather than 
simply sweeping all state RPSs from the field, a federal RPS could declare that a state 
                                                     
218 Dallas Burtraw & Karen L. Palmer, Mixing It Up: Power Sector Energy and Regional and 
Regulatory Climate Policies in the Presence of a Carbon Tax, in Implementing a US Carbon Tax, supra 
note 189, at 191, 204–206. 
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RPS conflicts with the federal RPS unless the state RPS (i) conforms to various federal 
parameters, and (ii) does not provide for any parochial preference to in-state generators. 
This latter approach would allow states to set ambitious renewables targets without 
encumbering the electricity sector with diverse programmatic requirements and other 
barriers that might run afoul of the dCC.  
Ignoring agriculture. Due to the lack of detailed accounting of the emissions 
implications of particular subsidies or policy provisions, this paper does not discuss in 
any detail the nature of the conflict between a carbon tax and federal agriculture policies 
that currently support emissions-intensive agricultural products and practices. 
Nonetheless, it counsels that subsidies that can be linked clearly to emissions-intensive 
agricultural products and practices should be on the negotiating table and earmarked as 
conflicting with a carbon tax.  
CONCLUSION 
Carbon tax legislation can only emerge from negotiations that consider a host of 
policies, chiefly relating to energy, environmental protection, and land use. This paper 
identifies the most salient of those policies and characterizes their relationship to a 
carbon tax as Complementary, Concurrent, or Conflicting. This categorization is meant 
to help inform negotiators, researchers, and others, and to avert facile 
mischaracterizations of particular policies based on their political optics and popularity 
rather than their effects. The last part of this paper highlights particular policy tradeoffs 
that could pose risks to the overarching goal of a legislated carbon tax, namely climate 
change mitigation.  
 
